Asia Centre

In Taiwan, the movement demanding the resignation of President Chen Shui-bian was in the forefront of the media and political scene all through September^[1]. While one could imagine that the communist leaders would have observed with delight the popular condemnation of a statesman they abhor, Chinese reaction was in reality more qualified. This article from Zhengming sheds interesting light on the decision-making mechanisms in China where the question of Taiwan is concerned. Above all, it confirms Chinese fears of contagion of the People's Republic from Taiwan, in the form of an extension of the fight against corruption and of the demonstrations calling for the resignation of political leaders^[2].

On September 5 2006, the Central Committee's Political Bureau announced the creation of an "observation group of the Taiwanese situation" (中央台灣局勢觀察組), answerable directly to the Political Bureau. The mission of this temporary structure is to analyse in detail the evolution of domestic unrest in Taiwan in order to adjust China's Taiwan policy accordingly, but also to conserve the "initiative" (主動性) in cross-Strait relations. Among the group, which is directed by Zeng Qinghong^[3], are three members of the Political Bureau: Wang Zhaoguo (vice-president of the permanent committee of the People's Congress), Zhang Dejiang (the Party's general secretary in the province of Canton), and Cao Gangchuan (vice-president of the military affairs committee and Minister of Defence). Also present are two senior military leaders of the PLA: its chief of staff, Liang Guanglie, and Zhang Hetian (a member of the command in the military region of Fujian). Tang Jiaxuan, Chen Yunlin (director of the bureau of Taiwanese Affairs of the Council of State and of the Central Committee) and Wang Gang^[4] (director of the Secretariat of the Central Committee) make up the rest of this ad hoc structure. In Shanghai, Fuzhou and Shenzhen, the Political Bureau has announced the creation of three regional groups to monitor the Taiwanese situation.

During September, the observation group was the source of five directives, issued by the the Council of State, the Central Committee of the Party, the Department of Propaganda and the Ministry of Public Security, concerning preventive measures in order to prepare for the evolution of the situation in Taiwan and its possible repercussions on social order in China.

Events in Taiwan have been the origin of a heightening of the level of alert of the apparatus responsible for relations with Taiwan, but also of all the structures responsible for mainland China's domestic security.

On September 5, the Council of State published an initial directive sent to the provincial organisations of the Party, as well as the propaganda and public security structures of the State. This directive requested its recipients to increase their level of vigilance and understanding of the political situation on the island, but also to protect at any price the security and "rights" of Taiwanese residents and travellers in China. It forbade them to make comments on the situation in Taiwan which might be interpreted as an evolution in the central government's line towards Taiwan. Finally, on the influence the situation in Taiwan could have on the Chinese provinces, the document calls for preparation, vigilance and swift action against any "budding" of unrest inspired by the anticorruption movement on the island.

The next day, the Department of Propaganda sent an urgent directive to the units responsible for propaganda, the publishing houses, and the various media, as well as to the academies of social science and research structures of the various provinces. The directive enjoins them to cover unrest in Taiwan within the framework of the rules applied to information about Taiwan and to send all documents concerning the latter to the provincial bureau of propaganda for examination, while announcing that after publication or broadcast, their authors would be responsible for the content of their texts. It also forbids them to make political comments on events in Taiwan, in order not to produce any counter-productive effects. Lastly it emphasises the extreme prudence to be practised in relation to any information on the events in Taiwan if these become "violent" and recalls the essential role of the bureau of propaganda in the selection of news and pictures. In the provinces of Canton, Hunan, Jiangxi and Jiangsu, the propaganda authorities have had to deal ruthlessly with the publication of news which went beyond the framework established by the Chinese authorities.

On September 18 the general offices of the Central Committee of the Council of State issued a directive relating to "security work during the holiday period" of the national holiday. It was adressed to the high provincial officials of the People's Armed Police, of Public Security and of the military authorities. It expressly requests them to double vigilance on the eve of the national holiday and of the 6^th plenary session of the 16^th Central Committee, because "forces hostile" to China could use the pretext of unrest in Taiwan to increase the intensity of their activities. On September 20, the Council of State and the central committee for military affairs simply cancelled the leave of all top-ranking leaders of the People's Armed Police and of Public Security, instructing them to increase the level of alert (執勤等級).

During a meeting of the observation group, Zeng Qinghong summarised Chinese preoccupations in the face of the anti-Chen Shui-bian movement in Taiwan, without stipulating the responses envisaged by Beijing in case of developments deemed to be unacceptable to the communist authorities. These can be summed up as taking five main directions:

-          Monitoring the situation carefully if it evolves towards major social unrest and towards a loss of control on the part of the Taiwanese authorities.

-          Increasing attention to the reactions of Chen Shui-bian, in particular in case he seeks to create a diversion by accelerating his independence agenda, for example by using the pretext of constitutional reform (which he has since done, without any major consequences).

-          Observing American response, as well as its "degree of implication" (介入程度) in events on the island.

-          Observing the evolution of the degree of linkage between the Japanese government and supporters of independence in Taiwan, and Tokyo's involvement.

-          Maintaining vigilance as to the possible consequences of the Taiwanese situation on sociopolitical equilibrium on the mainland.

The Chinese authorities have recently sought to promote sustainable development in their country. This has already been seen at environmental level. This article emphasises the Social Responsibility of Enterprises (SRE)

Social Accountability 8000 (SA 8000) is a standard established by the American organisation Social Accountability International (SAI). It has been adopted by a range of American and European companies and NGOs, and is comparable to standards such as ISO 9000 and ISO 14000[1].

It aims to develop SRE by improving the working conditions and rights of workers. For example, it forbids companies to use child labour, to impose constraints on their employees, to confiscate identity papers or money from workers, to prevent the formation of worker's associations, not to respect the religious beliefs and customs of their employees, to make them work more than 48 hours per week, to allow them less than one day off per week, etc.

Chinese experts have listed 20 major problems linked to conditions in Chinese companies. These are the main ones: the illegal employment of minors; the confiscation of part of the salary or of the identity papers of employees; illegal confinement and violation of the rights of workers; adding hours to normal working times; wages below the guaranteed minimum  wage and illegal costs imposed on workers; delays in paying wages (particularly to the mingong[2]) ; barebones social insurance and the lack of payments provided for by law; poor housing conditions (in terms of hygiene, security, etc.); the violation of safety standards (lack of fire extinguishers, lack of training for employees on procedures in case of fire, etc.); the use of chemical products or poisons which do not conform to safety standards; the lack of safety equipment for each employee; the lack of unions or employee organisations; discrimination based on gender, social or geographical origin, qualifications and age; the lack of maternity leave, and finally harassment. In comparison, the Observatory of the Social Repsonsibility of Enterprises notes the following problems: unhygienic conditions; gaps in social insurance; lack of work contracts; the violation of minimum  wage standards and unpaid wages; forced labour; the exploitation of the mingong; shortcomings in the right to strike; child labour; the lack of union freedom.

This problem of deplorable working conditions concerns both Chinese and foreign companies (see box). China is now the world leader in terms of work-related hazards, illness and death. According to official statistics (whose reliability is naturally doubtful), 1.6 million companies have dangerous workplaces and 200 million Chinese employees are exposed to various risks in the workplace. A report published in 2003 counted 10,647 work-related illnesses.

The article gives the example of a textile company in the province of Hebei, Ningfang, which has applied SA 8000. Before, working conditions were deplorable: employees were housed in rooms of about 4 square metres, apprentices had to climb up on the lights to dust them off, and above all — according to the magazine — the most unbelievable thing was that the women's toilets could be accessed only by passing through the men's.  "We didn't have the right to negotiate, or the right to eat; we had to beg for our pay, check the tax deductions, and there was only one toilet !" complained one employee. Since the enterprise has applied SA 8000, new toilets have been built; there are now five. Major efforts have been made in the hygiene and security of workers. Over a million yuans have been invested in replacing the old company restaurant with three new canteens. An additional floor has been added to the building where the workers are housed, with an emergency exit and first aid kits in the rooms. Around 100,000 yuans have been invested in these dormitories.

Wang Kequn recognises that the SA 8000 standard is likely to be difficult to apply, particularly in labour-intensive industries such as electronics, textiles and clothing, leather, toys, and the craft industries. In these sectors accidents are frequent, employees use toxic products and workers' rights are often violated.

It is to be noted however that a Chinese SRE standard already exists: China Social Compliance 9000 (CSC 9000), a management standard which applies to the textile and clothing sectors. Strangely enough, it is not mentioned in this article.

Widespread application of this standard is therefore likely to be difficult. Wang lists some proposals to make it easier: 1) the population must be made aware and understand that improving working conditions is a challenge; 2) the labour law (劳动法, passed in 1994 but very inconsistently applied) needs to be more rigorously enforced; 3) asking the government to take measures to make companies discipline themselves; 4) adjusting the country's production facilities in order to facilitate the application of these standards by export companies, and, finally, 5) setting up effective methods of inspection.

However the main motivation which seems to encourage companies to adopt these standards is not a moral one. Companies which apply SA 8000 hope to facilitate their exports to the United States and Europe. The retention measures applied to Chinese products by Western customs remain a major preoccupation to the country's companies (the total value of Chinese products stopped by the customs is said to have reached 1.79 billion dollars in 2005). The article estimates that the EU reduces by 5% the customs charges on the products of companies which have applied SA 8000.

More generally, this promotion of the SA 8000 should be set in the context of the improvement in working conditions, in the framework of the construction of an "averagely affluent society" (小康社会). It is a complement to plans to improve living conditions in the countryside and programmes to raise wages. SRE could thus become an important element of the populist tendency in the discourse of the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao partnership, alongside environmental protection[3].

The question is how successful these standards will be with companies, especially at local level. While sustainable development has become an official objective at central level, it is still far from being so in many localities.

Foreign companies caught out

Great news in the struggle for the environment: on September 7 2006 the SEPA (State Environmental Protection Administration) and the BNS (Bureau of National Statistics) published a "Research report on the calculation of Green GDP in 2004"[1] which, as its title indicates, contains an assessment of Green GDP for 2004[2]. This scotched rumours that the project had been abandoned a few months ago[3].

Green GDP (绿色, GDP) is the same as traditional GDP, minus the environmental impact. The principle is to calculate the cost of pollution on growth.

The report concludes that the damage caused by pollution has reached 511.8 billion yuans, or 3.05% of GDP, while fictitious costs (虚拟成本, the necessary expenses of "cleanup" for renewable energy) amount to 1.8% of GDP.

Beyond this success it must be kept in mind that this project is the result of almost ten years of struggle, and that it remains, in many respects, unsatisfactory, despite the praises of foreign experts.

It all began in 1996 when the BNS set up a department to assess production and natural resources. In 2002, the means available to the BNS were increased for the first time, while it launched assessemnts of water and forest resources in the provinces of Heilongjiang and Hainan, as well as in Chongqing.

However, as the Chinese environmental situation continued to get worse, pressure on the authorities grew. The SEPA continued to suffer from a lack of authority, and it became increasignly urgent to reinforce it. The turning point was on October 3 2004 when Hu Jintao mentioned Green GDP for the first time. He emphasised "the necessity for finding a means of calculating the Green people's economy" The project was taken up by the BNS and the SEPA, who fixed a deadline of three to five years to carry it out. The calculation of this indicator was to be based on UN reports published in the 1970s, on the Integrated Environmental and Economic Account system (IEEA). It must be noted that the project was completed at least a year ahead of time.

At present, other research in this direction is also being carried out, with the SEPA and the BNS in the course of preparing a report in collaboration with the National Forest Administration and the Water Bureau. This report, which Caijing hopes will be made public, concerns forests, ore, water, etc.

China appears to be a pioneer in this field. Research of a similar nature has indeed been carried out in countries such as Japan, China, Indonesia, Mexico and the Northern European countries. However, experst consider that these studies have not passed the experimental stage.

According to Caijing, the news of this Green GDP was therefore received with enthusiasm by international environmental specialists. The magazine quotes praise from various prestigious international figures such as Herman Daly, a former senior economist at the World Bank, and now a professor at the University of Maryland, Thomas Lyon, co-di­rector of the Erb Institute of Global Sustainable Enterprise, Gernot Wagner of  Harvard University, and Bindu Lohani of the Asian Development Bank. Globally, they all congratulate China on this success and hope that the Western countries will follow this example.

And yet, as usual, Caijing casts a highly critical eye on Green GDP, which it accuses of being "pale green" (浅绿色, GDP).

The first problem stems from the fact that there is still no unanimously accepted definition of Green GDP. For example, some contend that all traces left by human activity should be included in its calculation.

However, more generally, there is a consensus on about twenty costs which are recognised as polluting. The Chinese Green GDP incorporates only ten of these. Among those left out are damage to underground water reserves and pollution of the soil. Wang Jinan, leader of the group responsible for the calculation of the Green GDP recognises the limitations of his work. Some environmental dmamge cannot translate into costs, he admits. On a health level, it is extremely difficult to assess the links between enivronmental damage and death rates. How can it be ascertained whether or not certain illnesses are linked to the environment? And, even if a link is demonstrated, how can it be translated into GDP? For example, how can the fact that pollution can reduce life expectancy by ten years be expressed in GDP?

Another problem concerning the calculation of this Green GDP, is the assessement of fictitious costs. Hu Tao, in charge of the SEPA's Centre for political research into the environment and the economy, considers that they are impossible to determine precisely. How can costs be calculated when they are not the result of trade?

Moreover, the breaking down of costs by year, in the same way as GDP growth, can seem arbitrary: environmental damage has to be considered as cumulative.

The article also seems to infer that the establishment of the Green GDP is hampered by purely institutional factors. Firstly, the SEPA lacks power. Next the ministries and departments concerned by Green GDP are numerous. As well as the SEPA, these include the BNS, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources, the Bureau of Forests, the Bureau of Seas and Oceans, etc.

Caijing calls for the reinforcement of the tools available to these structures. There also seem to be problems of coordination between them.

Beyond these administrative questions, Lei Ming, of the Guanghua Institute of  Management of the University of Beijing emphasises that Chinese are generally all the more difficult to assess for being difficult to access.

Lastly the question arises of the concrete repercussions of these advances. Green GDP remains an "abstract" standard. The "Green GDP spirit" ("绿色GDP" 这个概念) is unlikely to spread among the population for years to come. Nor will this index be sufficient to make Chinese growth more ecologically responsible, as Pan Yue, director of the SEPA deplores. At the same time, Qiu Xiaohua, the new director of the BNS, considers that it is necessary to change the structures of governance, otherwise China will not succeed in improving its environmental situation. The relative pessimism of these senior leaders is enough to leave one confused.

These two articles were published after the North Korean ballistic missile tests on July 4, but before the nuclear test on October 9, in the journal of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), the most important Chinese international relations institute. Written by the president of the CICIR, on the one hand, and by the director of its strategic research centre on the other, they are more complementary than really divergent[1]. And yet, despite a number of points in common, the emphasis differs occasionally between one article and the other. Mr. Cui notes that on the subject of relations between China and North Korea, which are influenced by both historical factors and realistic considerations, there is a range of opinion among Chinese experts: however, "the dominant trend among [Chinese] leaders considers that traditional Chinese-Korean relations must be preserved in order to safeguard peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula".

Mr. Cui Liru puts forward the trend in Chinese foreign policy which leads China to play the role of a strategic pendulum in relation to the weakening of North Korea since the fall of the USSR. It was this development which led China to go beyond a strict policy of non-intervention to which it had adhered since the end of the Korean War. Militarily, that confrontation was between the United States and North Korea; strategically, it was between the United States and the Soviet Union. With the fall of the latter, as well as the political changes in South Korea, it was the confrontation between North Korea and the United States which became the main characteristic of the geopolitical situation in the region. China then had to get involved, in order to "avoid the worst", which is to say military conflict, and to prepare positive change on the peninsula. China has since played the role of a "strategic pendulum" (战略平衡角色, zhanlue pingheng juese), a role which South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun has also taken on, as Mr. Cui mentions.

He notes that, beyond being brothers in arms in the Korean War, political and security needs have become different in the two countries because of the widening economic gap between them. But it is important to understand that North Korea's attitude "is absolutely not irrational"; it can be deduced from the "Cold War" system which persists on the peninsula and in which North Korea finds itself in an unfavourable position, which leads to a "singular logic of behaviour". The economic ruin and the collapse of the North are a danger to its neighbours and to the region as a whole, even as it benefits from the strategic rebalancing brought about by relations between China and North Korea. North Korea's sensitivity about questions of sovereignty also imposes a prudent attitude on China: Chinese influence, inherited from traditional links, is limited, even though it is mythified by a number of foreign analysts.

It is true that South Korea has developed strong links with China, of which Mr. Cui makes a detailed and optimistic assessment, including human contacts (2 million visitors in 2003, 180,000 long-term South Korean residents in China in 2005, including 35,000 students). This is the result of Roh Moo-hyun's "independence policy", although China "does not harbour the illusion that South Korea would place [their] relations above those with the United States". The latter maintain twofold relations with China, a combination of cooperation as well as competition and conflict: this is true where North Korea  is concerned, and particularly in the six-party talks where the Americans asked North Korea  to "atone for the original sin" of nuclear power (赦免的原罪, shimian de yuanzui), without recognising its sovereignty or its legitimate concerns.

While wishing to be an "honest broker" (an American term which has entered the Chinese language), China has different objectives from the United States: it wants peace and stability on the peninsula, while  America's priority, in line with the "Big Stick" tradition, goes to denuclearisation.

Mr. Lin Limin of course takes up a number of these points, with occasional nuances in their expression or in their order of importance. Emphasising historical factors — Japanese milirarism, the crossing of the 38^th parallel by the United States in 1950, despite Chinese warnings — he considerably downplays their contemporary strategic impact: Japan and the United States are no longer in the same hostile relationship with China, and the Chinese nuclear arsenal dissuades and makes impossible any military adventure aimed at northeast China; Korea "is no longer a front door to China" on a strategic level. It is historical memories and subjective feelings which persist, "in particular in the Chinese army".

One must therefore look for realistic reasons to explain China's new involvement, since 2002, in the management of the Korean nuclear crisis. This follows the policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping, who recommended peaceful coexistence, non-interference and lack of criticism. China must first of all protect North Korea for reasons of prestige and national honour, as the collapse of North Korea would be considered a political setback for China.

Next, although it has been falling since 1991, Chinese trade with North Korea seems to be stabilising at between 1 and 2 billion dollars per year. While this is modest, it nevertheless brings "stability and prosperity" to Northeast    China. Moreover, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea has ore and precious metals[2] ; Chinese investment (100 million dollars in 35 projects up to 2003) seems therefore likely to increase.

Stategically, on the other hand,  the nuclearisation of North Korea risks bringing about, in a chain reaction, that of Japan and of Taiwan, as well the destabilisation of Northeast Asia, which is the mainspring of the peaceful growth of China's economy. A crisis would thus lead to the flow of millions of North Korean refugees into China, threatening the prosperity of the provinces of the Northeast. Although it is allied to North Korea, China also shares certain interests in Northeast Asia with the United States: the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, through a multilateral process, as well as Sino-Japanese relations and the impact of a crisis on the situation in the Taiwan Strait. Finally, Mr. Lin does not erect a monument to six-party talks, but recalls the precedents of the four-party talks in 1997-1999[3] and the tripartite talks in the Spring of 2003[4]. The latter meeting saved the face of the two protagonists, with the North Koreans being able to believe that China's role was limited to that of host, and the United States being able to see it as a multilateral meeting.

In fact, Mr. Lin balances without really choosing between a more directly involved China, evidently inspired by concerns which have little to do with the past, and a reminder of the five principles of peaceful coexistence and non-intervention.

In their respective articles, Tian Jingmei and Zhao Qinghai analyse the prospects and influence of the agreement between America and India on civilian nuclear cooperation.

A comparison between their thinking essentially reveals four points of convergence which express the caution of the Chinese defence community vis-à-vis this bilateral agreement, with its many multilateral consequences. By omitting from their reflection two important areas of the problem, they reveal a certain difficulty on China's part in formulating its position, including its official position, on the subject of the agreement. The silence in Beijing which followed the American and Indian announcements tends to confirm this.

The global framework of the agreement

On July 18 2005, Washington and New Delhi announced that they were going to begin global civilian nuclear cooperation. An agreement was reached on March 2 2006, and in July 2006 the US House of Representatives began an amendment procedure which is likely to last some time still.

In return, India must proceed with a separation of its civilian and military programmes, submit the former to the inspection of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), sign the latter's additional protocol, maintain its moratorium on nuclear tests and (continue to) maintain non-proliferation by meeting the criteria of the NSG and of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Four points of convergence

India is winning more than it is losing. Its commitments are in fact more symbolic than real, since they are not legally binding (according to Tian Jingmei). Some are even of a cosmetic nature: the law on the control of exports is simply India's response to the demands made by Resolution 1540 passed by the UN Security Council in April 2004, and should not therefore be credited to this agreement. Moreover, there are substantial contradictions to be found in the Indian concessions: thus the support shown by Delhi for a future treaty banning the production of fissionable material contradicts the continuation of its production in India. Finally, the agreement as it is at present envisaged will be easy to circumvent and even to divert. Indeed, since India has the possibility of reclassifying any nuclear facility in the civilian or military domain, it will be easy for her to recycle in the arms circuit any nuclear fuel conceded under the agreement[1].

Delhi's objectives are not subjected to any very penetrating analysis, since they seem so commonplace: ending its "nuclear isolation" (核独立), diversifying its energy sources, rationalisating its nuclear generating facilities and loosening the constraints caused by its limited urianium resources.

Tian Jingmei concedes nonetheless that this is unprecedented progress where India is concerned. But when his arguments are considered, he finally merely underlines what Zhao Qinghai says (quoting Condoleezza Rice) : it is no doubt also because Washington's Indian policy had previously been a total failure.

The United States are losing more than they are winning. Not in the sense of a zero sum game, where India's gain would be their loss, but because of their global security interests. This calculation subordinates profit and loss to the possible effects of this agreement on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and on the predictable competition which will affect the Indian nuclear market. On the one hand — and this is the common basis of both articles — the structure of the NPT is seriously shaken by the agreement; on the other, the sale of two nuclear reactors to India is not sufficient to justify this agreement (it is even "negligible" says Zhao Qinghai, quoting former President Jimmy Carter). Both authors note that the United States has never had the intention of slowing the development of India's nuclear arsenal, and both quote American Secretary of State Nick Burns[2]. Thus emerges the question of American interest in an agreement which renounces the principles previously preached by Washington[3]. Zhao Qinghai skilfully quotes American experts[4] referring to the shadow of a desire for the containment of China, without restricting himself to this aspect of motivations in Washington:  also reviewed are aims linked to non-proliferation (the Treaty is deadlocked at present), to energy (reducing India's fossil fuel needs) and to the economy (nuclear fuel and experts to be placed).

A long process, but a favourable trend

Numerous obstacles lie in the way of the realisation of the agreement, but it is enjoying increasing support. Congress was initially careful to maintain control to the end of the legislative process by denying the Bush Administration automatic acceptance of the agreement ninety days after it was signed. The agreement thus consists of a "very very delicate" balance, constrained, controversial, and lengthy. American non-proliferation experts consider it an unfortunate precedent and perceive a possible "chain reaction" which would lead to a loss of security for the United States.

The alternating work characteristic of the American checks and balances system, which is the object of very detailed analysis from Zhao Qinghai, will impose this concern on the President to the end. However, a tougher text providing for suspension of the agreement in the event of the slightest deviation on India's part risks discouraging the investment of private capital. Moreover, new conditions[5] imposed in extremis by Congress would be certain to antagonize India, since the most hardline elements among Indian nationalists already fear alignment with Washington.

A similar balance must be struck in reaching agreemeny with the IAEA. While the latter has welcomed the US-India project, more guarantees tailored to India's particular situation remain to be found and negotiated.

The members of the NSG will also have to be convinced, one by one. While the UK, France and Russia[6] already support the agreement, other states among the forty members are more reticent and will take time to convince.

All these brakes do not threaten the process itself, however. Both Tian and Zhao emphasise that time is on its side: the supporters of the agreement are rallying the initially undecided, while opponents are increasingly isolated.

Less predictable consequences for the region than for the NPT

Both authors agree in their assessment of the haze of danger the agreement spreads over South Asia. Starting from the principle (and quoting Islamabad) that Pakistan will not fail to react, they judge that the agreement will perhaps lead to an arms race, before adding — in Tian Jingmei's case — that in any case there will inevitably be regrettable consequences on subregional stability. This point of view, which could be summarised as "maybe not, but certainly", underlines the impossibility of imagining any outcome other than the worsening of the nuclear antagonism between India and Pakistan. No other possibility is envisaged by Tian or Zhao, who note the American refusal to accord the same treatment to Pakistan as to India.

However, certainty returns on the subject of the global consequences on the NPT. Both writers once again quote Nick Burns, who has justified the difference in the treatment given to India, Iran and North Korea by the difference in the responsibility of their international behaviour, and object that visible "discrimination" will have a negative effect on global support for the United States. Tian Jingmei considers that, far from bringing India closer to the mainstream of the international treaty, as Washington has claimed, the agreement will on the contrary distance several states from it, thus betraying the principles and the contract[7] which underlie the NPT (核不扩散条约的基本原则和交易). Moreover, Zhao Qinghai stipulates that it is untrue to say that India avoids proliferation[8].