Asia Centre

The originators of this proposal were two local figures: Xu Hui and Zhang Youliang. Mrs. Xu Hui, an economics professor at Lanzhou university, had become known to the Gansu provincial legislative offices in September 2002, when as a private citizen she responded to an appeal from the authorities who were drawing up a bill to prevent water pollution in the part of Gansu crossed by the Yellow River. Her suggestions had been appreciated and debated, but the financial and technical constraints upon provincial resources had not enabled the law in question to be adopted.

Mr. Zhang, who lectures in law at the Lanzhou technological university, heads the team drawing up the legal bill. His research interests are concerned with citizens' participation. It was he who wished to include in the "bill on the rules concerning the legislative process" a provision allowing citizens to present their suggestions "directly" to the standing committee. In his view "the meaning which must be given to the concept of a harmonious society" is that it promotes "the spirit of citizens' participation" (公民参与的精神, gongmin canyu de jingshen).

In specific terms, this "bill concerning the governance of the legislative process of the Gansu provincial Assembly and its standing committee" provides, in article 4, that "the organisations, enterprises, communal groups, and private citizens may submit their suggestions concerning legislative matters to the standing representatives of the provincial Assembly, either directly or through the deputies who represent them, the panels of experts, or the working groups of the standing committee".

This would be the first time that such a "right of legislative suggestion" (立法建议的权力, lifa jianyi de quanli) to the standing committee of a provincial Assembly had been granted to ordinary citizens. Formerly, the latter only took part in the legislative process when they were requested. Yang Xingchang, head of the legislative office within the standing committee of the Gansu provincial Assembly, emphasises that it concerns only a right to make suggestions (提议权, tiyiquan) and not a "legal bill" (提案权, ti’anquan) which is subject to strict procedural rules. The latter bill can in fact only be proposed through the committee which presides over the provincial Assembly, by the standing committee of the Assembly, by a committee of experts, by the provincial government, by an official delegation, or by groups including more than ten deputies. Yang Xingchang believes that with this right of suggestion "the way to the expression of the citizens' will should become less constricted".

Zhang Youliang defends his proposal on the grounds that it has now become possible to give ordinary citizens the right to suggest laws, because two preconditions have already been met. Firstly, there is a "participatory consciousness among the ordinary citizens" which is being "continually re-awakened", and secondly freer access to information is no longer "monopolised by the State" but is "shared by all".

Having set out these two points, Zhang nonetheless acknowledges that there are limits to his proposed law. Under present circumstances, the citizens' "right of suggestion" is necessarily "purely formal", since no decision has yet been made concerning its practical implementation, or in other words the concrete means of its expression (how it could be framed, in what form, and with what consequences). At present, private citizens are not allowed to attend the debates over any new laws under consideration. Mr. Zhang would therefore like to see the proposal being given a more specific content to take it beyond being a formal right. He also recognises that it is arousing strong opposition, and he believes that it "may not be adopted" by the national People's Congress whose "closed circuit" operations and lack of openness he deplores.

Although Yang Xingchang gave the proposal a favourable response, he raised questions over society's readiness for it. He wondered whether the citizens would greet it with "sufficient enthusiasm" and whether their suggestions would be of sufficient quality. That is why he recommended that "this route" towards citizens' participation be opened up, but "not too much".

He describes the best known of the Chinese think tanks and identifies their means of interacting with the decision-makers, as well as the different outlets through which their opinions are conveyed: conferences, discussion meetings, reports, articles, and specially arranged meetings with leaders. Through the picture presented by this writer, the reader grasps the nature of a relationship which is as much a function of the status of the research institute as of the personal affinities between a particular leader and an expert.

Ma distinguishes between two types of research centre. The first of these is a place for training cadres, of which the best known are the Party School and the School of Administrative Studies, which serve as a platform for organising meetings and exchanges between experts and leaders from the different provinces.

As the Party School clearly functions as guide, adviser, and trainer in the ideological field, it is not surprising to see journalists crowding around those who teach there to gather their views, particularly at the time of Party Congresses or before major political announcements. The continual to-and-fro between the Party cadres and the lecturers at the School means that the latter, who often take part in drawing up statements, turn out to be reliable sources for the detection of future trends. A good example is the way in which the official Xinhua press agency emphasised the importance of Hu Jintao's speech to the Party School on June 25th 2007, as an indicator of the political line to be adopted at the 17th Congress[1].

The School of Administrative Studies ( 国家行政学院, guojia xingzheng xueyuan) also participates in drawing up documents and conducting research in the important areas of political or economic reforms. For example, it has recently completed a study on the social security system which will be submitted to the State Council. On average, it produces two studies each year, which are the outcome of working group meetings involving ministers, vice-ministers, or local leaders concerned with the issue concerned. These working groups then send a report to the State Council, and this is followed by an informal discussion between State Council leaders and researchers to address the conclusions which they have reached. The State Council may then produce a statement on the question, and it is in light of the "spirit of this statement" and the conclusions of the working group that a ministerial group is formed in order to carry out improvements to the text of the statement. Finally, this text is submitted to the State Council for approval.

In 1998, the School of Administrative Studies completed some research projects on the reform and supervision of the banking system, and in 2000 their attention turned to the implementation of the policy of "developing the Big Western Region" (西部开发, xibu kaifa). This year the two meetings have been concerned with keeping social order and social security. The Party School is thought to be proceeding in the same general direction, but on different specific topics.

The research centres which are directly dependent upon the State Council, like the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CAS and CASS) or the powerful macroeconomic research centre of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), produce between 300 and 400 studies per year. They are also involved in the research and compilation of texts for the five-year plans and for administrative regulations. They deal more with economic issues, whereas the schools take part in writing Party Congress or plenary session speeches.

What are the channels of communication and influence?

The writer points to many kinds of communication between the institutions and the decision-makers, the first of which are studies "commissioned" by leaders, sometimes even on a paid basis. These reports may deal with cross-departmental subjects like macroeconomic controls or social management, or else more specific issues related to the field of the expert being consulted. The latter is sometimes brought into an enterprise to support the implementation of a policy initiative.

Most of these research projects are developed over a certain period of time, particularly those preparing for the five-year plans, which are undertaken by the NDRC. Others can be quite short-term or even urgent, as was the case at the time of the Asian economic crisis or the events of September 11th.

Another means of communication available to experts are "internal" publications. These reports are not necessarily commissioned by the authorities, but they are often read by leading politicians, and may have been undertaken as the outcome of a personal encounter with an expert. Similarly, this author reports that an official or his secretary sometimes takes a close interest in some researchers' work, and asks to receive an internal report as soon as it is published.

But the most direct channel of expert influence is still through personal encounters outside the main business of conferences and forums. These take the form of private conversations, or study sessions for politburo leaders during which experts are called to present their field of expertise.

The frequency of these exchanges, and the number of reports which the research centres are required to produce, have increased steadily since the beginning of the reforms and the opening up, but they have leaped ahead over the last decade as the questions demanding attention have become more complex and the leaders are becoming more willing to rationalise the decision-making procedures. There is a greater demand for experts and their advice gets more attention. Wen Jiabao himself has stated his view that no piece of expert advice could do him any harm.

It is worth noting, however, that no mention is made of the role and status of centres specialising in international affairs, or of university centres. And there is a noticeable paucity of details concerning the State Council's Centre for Research and Development, even though it is referred to in passing.

When expert influence is solicited, its status in the system remains ambiguous, and this writer reports a cautious tone in the way policy recommendations are formulated even when this is not explicitly called for ("given the close relations between researchers and decision-makers, it may happen that a researcher influences political decisions by alluding to a particular recommendation"). On the other hand, given the frequency of their interaction with the political leaders, experts who do not belong to official circles nonetheless tend to talk as though their views had official approval. For example, when China decided not to devalue the renmenbi in the face of the Asian crisis, one researcher was reported as recommending a degree of flexibility in the value of the national currency. The immediate result was a destabilisation of the Hong Kong markets. The situation was only rectified after the NDRC affirmed that there would be no change in the value of the currency.

Accompanying these papers, Zhongguo Jingji Zhoukan has devoted a preliminary dossier to Hu Jintao's speech. The greater part of the dossier consists of articles by eight high-ranking experts, giving their reactions to Hu's speech. These exegetical exercises allow us to form a clearer idea of the main topics dealt with in the course of the Congress, and of their probable repercussions on the measures to be taken in economic policy over the next five years.

In his introduction to the dossier, Wang Mingfeng, who seems to be responsible for the whole issue, invokes the need to move towards a new model of growth. His expression "转变经济发展的方式" (zhuanbian jingji fazhan de fangshi) recalls the "second transition" which certain researchers have been talking about recently[1]. Most of the articles repeat the idea of the need to harmonise the country. Bai Jinfu, a central government research worker, uses the term "harmonisation" or integration (一体化, yitihua)[2] four times and he also talks of "fusion" ( 融合, ronghe).

The different articles express concern over the problems affecting China, which arise from the underdevelopment of the Chinese countryside.

Chinese rural society suffers from deficiencies in infrastructure, health care and education, social security, available employment, buying power etc. This backwardness in the countryside is the result - which is naturally not admitted in the papers - of the policies for growth in the 1980s and 1990s which gave priority to the big cities and the coastal regions. The papers state that until the countryside catches up with the towns, the nation will not have achieved its goal of modernisation.

The writers draw attention in general terms to the disparities between town and country. Rural society is backward; the countryside suffers from inadequate infrastructure, poor access to health care and education, and gaps in the jobs market.

Gu Kang, director of the Scientific Research Centre of the Ministry of Finance, dwells particularly on the problem of public finance. He emphasises three main problems: 1. Local governments are still quite ignorant in the area of public finance; 2. In the Western regions, many of the lower ranking local administrations (from the district level down) are experiencing serious financial difficulties; 3. If the government does not officially permit the local administrations to get into debt, the latter find indirect ways of doing so.

Mei Xinyu, from the Research Centre of the Ministry of Trade, stresses that the regional development policies (the best known being the "development of the Great West", but there are similar plans for the Northeast and the Centre) have not reached the levels which the authorities had hoped for, but they are still absolutely necessary for the regions concerned.

The different writers insist on the need to set up better mechanisms of co-ordination to unite the country, following the logic of "scientific development" (科学发展, kexue fazhan).

Overall, there is a general willingness to bring the countryside to the towns. Bai Jinfu calls for a move away from agricultural to non-agricultural activities, for an increase in the flows between the countryside and the towns, for improved integration between the urban and rural sectors, for a unification of infrastructures, for a better utilisation of land, and for the development of suburban peripheries (泛城市化, fanchengshihua).

More concretely, Mei Xinyu wishes to see a system set up to promote better co-ordination between the provinces (协调互动机制, xietiao hudong jizhi). These would ensure respect for the workings of the market and would efface the administrative barriers between the regions. He also thinks that the different localities should acquire their own specialised activities. This last point is also put forward in an article edited by Jiang Jufeng, the governor of Sichuan. He concludes with a call for a Chinese road to development in the small provincial towns (中国特色的新城镇化道路, zhongguo tese de xin chengzhenhua daolu). The principles behind this "Chinese road" would be: "town and country planning, a rational apportionment of land use, economic use of agricultural land, bringing capacities to perfection, and the large taking responsibility for the small" (统筹城乡，布局合理，节约土地， 功能完善，一大带小, tongchou cheng-xian, buju heli, jieyu tudi, gongneng wanshan, yida daixiao). The goal would be to achieve the harmonious development of towns of every size (促进大中小城市和小城镇协调发展, cujin dazhongxiao chengshi he xiao chengzhen xietiao fazhan), and to foment development towards new levels of economic growth (培育新的经济增长极, peiyu xin de jingji zengzhangji), whose final shape would be a town for everyone (城市群, chengshijun).

These articles are lacking in concrete examples and precise information. Only the journalist Wang Minfeng does some investigation. He takes as his first example the school at Gushan in Sanjia township (Chengde district in Hebei province). It was built in this backward area in 2002, and it includes an information centre, an IT room and a media room. In 2006, the local government provided an annual grant of 225 yuan per pupil. Wang describes it as an experiment to give a boost to education in backward areas. As his second example, he takes a rapid look at an experiment in the health sector whereby Jiangsu province is to offer health coverage to 200,000 of its unemployed and juvenile inhabitants. But each year, the number of unemployed and rural inhabitants receiving aid is estimated at 170 million. The experience of Henan (Nanyang) and Hunan are also mentioned, but again without any precise details.

First of all, there is a real complementarity of interests between the two countries. Paris needs large contracts to shore up the support given to the government by the major enterprises, as well as to improve France’s trade balance and reduce public deficit. It wants to continue to make economic cooperation and trade the driving force in bilateral relations, at the same time as maintaining a constructive and pragmatic approach and seeking to win over Beijing’s cooperation on issues that are important for Paris, such as the fight against global warming. For its part, Beijing needs an ally within the European Union to defend Chinese interests there, in particular given the prospect of a future lifting of the embargo on arms’ sales. Furthermore, China is always fond of technology transfer to make it capable, over time, of competing with the West, or at least of being less dependent on it. From this point of view, Sarkozy’s staunch pro-Atlantic stance has had no impact at all on Sino-French relations. The honeymoon just carries on between Paris and Beijing.

There is, however, one new factor which explains the importance China places on France, and that is the about-face of Berlin, which has decided to harden its policy towards Beijing. In consequence, according to Pan Xiaoshou, it was vital for Beijing to compensate for the cooling in Sino-German relations by strengthening its friendship with France. China has thus put in place its time-honoured strategy of divide and rule, which has a dual purpose. The one is to secure a supplier of technology at a time when the United States, Japan and Germany are adopting a circumspect attitude regarding the relevance of technology transfers to a State whose intentions remain obscure. The other is to try to maintain the approach of “using Europe to counter the United States” (拉歐制美, la’ou zhimei), or, at least, to avoid the situation of the West adopting a common diplomatic front based on democracy and human rights. In this regard, France was the best target.

Set alongside each other, the two selected analyses raise a fundamental issue. The 18th Congress in 2012 will choose the leaders to succeed Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, with Xi Jinping and Li Keqing being potentially in competition with each other for the post of secretary-general. Is it possible that the various arrangements and dealings that will inevitably take place in the lead-up to this election might see a return to instability of China’s political system, in the form of a power struggle for the top job?

Yang Kai-huang tries at first to play down the question. The Communist Party is under no strong pressure that would put it in jeopardy of losing power. Discontent is being contained, and, to this extent, no ideological dissent is capable of bringing about a fracturing of the Party’s unity. The supreme leader is therefore in a position to lay stress on a few points that constitute the core of his political agenda and his personal legacy for China, at the same time as remaining consistent with the model of development being followed. In Hu Jintao’s case, there are three priority areas: encouraging innovation, promoting social harmony by developing aspects of the welfare state, and introducing forms of democratisation.

Hu Jintao is not, however, strong enough to overcome the Party’s force of inertia and impose his own successor. Yang Kai-huang highlights two failures. The one is Mr Hu’s inability to build a real institutionalised system for the transfer of power; the other is his powerlessness to lead the Communist Youth League faction to total and absolute control over the Party and the State. Even if these failures need to be seen in a relative light, two problems flow from them, which are the return of a certain unpredictability regarding the question of succession and of conditions conducive to the emergence of a power struggle for control of the Party. In a worst case scenario, this would be bad news for the stability of China in the world.

Yang Kai-huang refuses to fall into despair, and moderates his analysis through an alternative theory. He observes that Mr Hu has distinguished himself through his ability to “bring together the five lakes and the four oceans” (團結五湖四海, tuanjie wuhu sihai), by relying on his resolve to strengthen China’s institutions, and through his constant search for stability for the regime. Why then should we not believe that the arrangement between Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang is not a step forward in the system for selecting a new Chinese leadership team? In preparing for power, not a supreme leader but a tandem, Mr Hu is thought to be introducing a dose of stability at an opportune time, whereby no Chinese politician is any longer strong enough to choose his successor himself.

His analysis is consistent with that of Chao Chun-shan, who nonetheless adopts a different approach. As someone who is known for his view that the Chinese political system is following a linear development thought to give it a growing institutional dimension with increased stability, Chao Chun-shan feels it is time for Sinology to abandon “Beijingology” and give up analysing Chinese domestic politics in terms of power struggles. Mao Tse-Tung and Deng Xiaoping clearly gained power, which they were able to consolidate, after relentless struggle. On the other hand, Hu Jintao’s power, like that of Jiang Zemin before him, has been the result of consultation and compromise. But neither compromise nor power struggles are relevant when it comes to describe how Hu Jintao’s successor will be determined. This is due to the fact that, contrary to past practice, the next Chinese leader will not be appointed because he defends a correct political line acceptable to the Party, but because he will be at the service of the political line on which the Party will have already agreed. The time of strong men is over. China has entered the era of “bureaucrats with technical expertise responding to the demand of the political marketplace”. For Chao Chun-shan, this means applying the theory of scientific development, dear to Hu Jintao, to the question of the transfer of power.