Asia Centre

According to the Party School, the Singaporeans have grasped the fact that Western multi-party democracy, which allows for shifts in power, is a destabilising factor incompatible with Chinese "national characteristics" (国情 , guoqing). Their city state has therefore set up a state where "one party holds power over the long term, and many parties coexist" (一党长期执政，多党并存, yidang changqi zhizheng, duodang bingcun). Unlike what happens in Western countries, this enables it to prevent "extremists in social provision, or opportunists, from coming to power". It seems to them that China, where eight small democratic parties[1] coexist on the periphery of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), has already set up such a system. In theory the satellite parties around the CCP could play a crucial role, by lending support to China's definition of itself and its regime as a "system of democratic centralism" (民主集中制, minzhu jizhongzhi). In reality, however, they serve as a smokescreen and make very little contribution either to the image of the CCP or to the formulation of its public policies. From this point of view, the party system in Singapore is more sophisticated and works better[2].

The primary reason for this is that the recurrent elections "reconfirm" (确认, queren) the People's Action Party in power, thus increasing its legitimacy. The Party School's report certainly does not trouble to underline the methods used by the Singaporean government to keep itself in power, for these make the city state a case of "illiberal democracy"[3]. But it does observe that the People's Action Party "makes considerable use of State resources to consolidate its power", even though that is not its main point. For the Chinese delegation, the important thing is the process of reconfirmation which "provides a rational basis for the legitimacy" (合法合理性, hefahelixing) of the People's Action Party.

The Party School sees in Singapore's party system an acceptable model for a limited separation of powers, in which the smaller parties provide a counter-weight to the dominant party without endangering it. The smaller Singaporean parties allow for "the satisfaction of the population's wish to exercise a certain control over the major party's use of power, by creating a channel through which the population can express its dissatisfactions with the majority party, thus diminishing its anger towards that party." In the final analysis, this system puts effective limits on the People's Action Party, by making it prudent and respectful of popular interests. In return, its perennial hold on power is reconfirmed. This kind of argument suggests that the Chinese delegation is inclined to see in the democratic process more than just a guarantee of the legitimacy of the dominant party. It allows for long term stability in the relationships within the political system, and it exerts additional pressure on the majority party never to forget its need to serve the general prosperity of the nation.

From this standpoint, the CCP has more options for implementing reforms than it thinks. The alternatives do not boil down to a choice between Western democracy or the gradual implanting of more democratic procedures within the Party itself. The Party School study group notes the need to be rid of certain mistaken theoretical beliefs: electoral procedures do not imply democracy, and multi-party governance does not necessarily lead to shifts in power. In their view, China has already established a system where "one party has a long term monopoly on power, and numerous parties coexist". But this must be strengthened in order to set up a system, as in Singapore, of a real "government by the elite" (精英治国制度, jingying zhiguo zhidu), reminiscent of Plato's Republic.

Another specific feature of the Singaporean political system which pleased the Party School, is that it has resolved the problem of official corruption without relying on democracy (involving the risk of the corrupt party losing power) or on the press as a watchdog to scent out every corruption scandal. In this respect, the example of Singapore allows for a counter-argument to the views often advanced in Taiwan, that democracy and freedom of the press are the best guardians against corruption. Their argument is that, without any need for fundamental political reforms, and by means of purely administrative reforms, the Party could improve its struggle against the corruption which is endemic in China, by turning to the experience of Singapore.

Firstly, an "energy bill" is being drafted. If it is passed into law at the NPC session in March, it will not only provide the overall legal dispensations for the energy sector, but also the basis for reintroducing a Ministry of Energy. This will be put in charge of setting prices, and of establishing the strategies for handling consumption and transport, as well as introducing new technologies and exploiting the country's natural resources. During the course of this session, the NPC may also approve a new environmental tax and strengthen the protection of the environment by promoting the State Environmental Protection Agency to make it a Ministry.

Are these measures a sufficient answer to China's energy and environmental problems? The analysts cited above all agree that an adequate response to these questions would require better management of the energy sector, and that organisations with sufficient powers could make up for many deficiencies in the present system.

The researchers at the University of Oil quoted in Zhongguo jingji shibao, explain that a Ministry of Energy would improve the country's ability to meet the challenges to its "energy security". A single central organisation, in charge of drawing up a national diplomatic approach to oil issues and backing up China's position on the international markets, could enable the achievement of the lofty strategic goals which the current structure cannot bring about. The current failure to create a strategic oil reserve is a case in point. The Energy Minister would represent China at international forums and demonstrate that "there is one person, able to speak consistently on China's behalf". In his previous post, Zhang Guobao was supposed to fulfil this role, but at the same time he was in charge of "re-invigorating the North-East" along with certain aspects of transport policy. So it is hardly surprising, say these writers, that Chinese oil companies compete fiercely against each other abroad, and that in so doing, despite their drive to maximise profits, they only succeed in driving down their prices. For the same reasons, faced with the growing tendency of the producing countries to nationalise their energy resources, an Energy Ministry would at last be able to give effective and timely support to the interests of Chinese companies[1].

It could also remedy the lack of cohesion in the development of the domestic energy sector, by providing an overall vision of its needs in terms of finance and technology, along with an integrated developmental strategy which would allow it to overcome the current fragmentation of the sector. The example of coal clearly illustrates this lack of cohesion. The overall regulations are in the hands of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), and the operational management is in the hands of the companies, but the management of coal deposits and their exploitation is under the Ministry of Natural Resources[2]. Likewise, the needs for energy conservation and the introduction of renewable energy - both of which are proclaimed goals of the government - go beyond the boundaries set by the current organisation into different sectors. They require an overall view and, above all, an institution with sufficient powers to impose its authority on the other players.

As we have seen, the re-establishment of the Ministry of Energy has been welcomed by expert analysts. Granting it the status of a ministry in charge of environmental protection also ought to give it the clout which it has lacked up till now. But will it be enough? While Zhongguo jingji shibao lists all the conditions required for the effective running of the ministry, the journal Caijing carries reports referring to the provisions in the bill to set it up, and these show, paradoxically, that the reality is very far from the picture conveyed by Zhongguo jingji shibao.

Ideally, what is required is the creation of an independent regulatory body, alongside the Ministry, and a careful delimitation of their respective functions. In addition all decision-making powers should be taken away from the other Ministries or offices which currently take decisions on behalf of the energy sector, or at least they should be put firmly under the authority of the Ministry of Energy. The latter should be concerned with strategic planning, and it should have a macroeconomic overview of the country's needs with regard to the development of energy resources, the introduction of new technologies, and the management of the industry, but without intervening in operational matters on a daily basis. For its part, the new regulatory body should take care of organising the market and overseeing the implementation of the strategies drawn up by the Ministry. The bill is currently under consideration by the organisations concerned. According to Caijing, the discussion is focused on the nature and functions of the regulatory body. Will it be independent? Xiao Guoxing, who took part in drafting the bill, believes that it will be difficult to get a truly independent regulatory body accepted, given the current state of the market and the existing balance between bureaucratic interests, and that it should therefore be placed under the supervision of the Ministry. Nonetheless, the bill clearly lays out the different responsibilities of the Ministry and the regulatory body, placing the latter under the supervision of the Ministry but giving it a certain latitude for independent action.

Is this a sufficient guarantee of its autonomy? When interviewed, the representative of a State oil enterprise seemed to think not. It will only introduce another mother-in-law into the partnership, leading to further complications in the approval processes, which are already slow and inefficient. But the nub of the question is the real power of the Ministry. In the proposed bill, it would be in charge of formulating policy and drawing up strategic plans, but approval for the exploitation of natural resources would remain in the hands of the Ministry of Natural Resources. Similarly, will the NDRC give up its power to set prices?

Through an interview with Dong Baohua, Nanfang zhoumo takes a look at the ability of the new law on labour contracts to respond to real social needs. At the same time, 21 shiji jingji baodao adopts a similar approach by publishing a contribution from Wang Dongjing, director of the economics department in the Party School, in order to examine the possibility of raising workers' wages in the private enterprises. The two experts agree that labour reform must be based on a serious consideration of the situation of the workers (the manual labourers, or mingong). But, according to Dong Baohua[1], that does not mean "over-protecting" the employees, because its effect would be to cut off the hand to cure the foot!

The stakes in the labour reforms are considerable. The main problem is to calm down the agitated social situation by regulating the workers' conditions of employment. In recent years, protests by workers and young people have grown louder, putting the central government in a difficult situation[2]. At the same time, the scandals of 2007[3], have brought Chinese people to an unprecedented level of awareness of the negative aspects of the nation's economic growth, graphically portrayed by Dong Baohua.

Similarly, last Autumn the Huawei affair proved to some people the desirability of a new law on labour contracts. In September 2007, Huawei told 7,000 employees who had worked there for eight years to resign and reapply in competition with each other. Although Huawei suspended this plan under pressure from the media and the All-China Federation of Trades Unions (ACFTU), that withdrawal did not calm the controversy.

The question of wage levels is a major issue in the labour reforms because the spectacular growth in the GDP and the profits of Chinese enterprises has not been accompanied by a rise in wages. As Wang Dongjing emphatically points out, if the State wishes to stimulate domestic consumption in order to bring overproduction under control, that requires an increase in wages, starting with the lowest paid.

To return to the Huawei affair, Dong Baohua sees in it a twin failure of the law on contracts, since it suits neither the companies nor the employees. Given the inflexibility which the new law will impose on the labour market, Dong Baohua welcomes the fact that firms like Huawei are looking for solutions - within the law - to adapt to the situation and to continue to grow nonetheless. He asserts in effect that with the introduction of this new law, China will become the country where it is the most difficult to lay off workers. The situation now is that, unlike the United States or the United Kingdom, China has imposed three conditions which have to be rigidly observed: there must be advance notice of any dismissal, the reasons for it must be given, and there must be financial compensation. That will make lay-offs costly, long, and complicated for Chinese companies.

As for the terms of the contract and its renewal, the law lays down a certain number of instances when firms will be obliged to give contracts of indeterminate duration (CIDs) to those employees who have already held two contracts of determinate duration, or those who have been employed for ten years or more. Despite the relative flexibility of some of the provisions, the professor is afraid that they will irreversibly freeze up the labour market. The introduction of CIDs will reduce the Chinese reserve labour pool to being a tank of stagnant water instead of ensuring the flow necessary to the economic vitality of the country. It will bring back the time of the "iron rice bowl".

Dong Baohua points to three problems which have distorted the drafting of the law. Firstly, he criticises its premise, that China must "build a stable and harmonious working environment". He believes that harmony is not the same as stability, and that excessive stability can lead to stagnation. Furthermore, the social situation and popular attitudes have led the deliberations astray. In his opinion, many legislators have a view of society which he considers simplistic. According to this view, from the beginning of its period of growth China has sought to strengthen the power of the companies at the expense of their workers; therefore it is now time to support the workers and exercise more control over the companies. Finally, Dong Baohua regrets the absence of wider consultations during the drafting of the law, which would have given the companies more opportunities to express their views. Consequently, the law has been shaped by the desire to build a more harmonious society and to protect the weak, but in the final analysis, it tends only to protect the wage earners instead of introducing a win-win relationship between the companies and their employees.

On the contrary, by trying to be too protective, the law has failed to address the real problems, especially those confronting labourers and the unemployed or those employees without job security. Dong Baohua argues that to achieve a healthy balanced growth, China must retain flexible conditions for taking on workers, ensure comprehensive social security provisions, especially for workers, and, lastly, use legal sanctions to prevent "non standard" relations between employers and workers. Unfortunately, instead of that, the legislators have set up an inflexible one-way system, when flexibility alone can maintain economic dynamism.

To put it bluntly, Dong Baohua foresees the practical implementation of the law in rather pessimistic terms. Firstly, firms will have less room for manoeuvre in managing their human resources. They will therefore be all the more careful in taking on extra labour. As for the employees, they will find themselves more swiftly excluded, unless they can prove that they are irreplaceable in terms of added value. But in reality, the vast majority of workers and low-level salaried staff are easily replaceable. Lastly, what Dong Baohua fears above all is that China will follow in the steps of France, which he considers to be a country marked by economic stagnation, 9% unemployment and high taxes, where it is impossible to alter established benefits without incurring strike action.

So, in the eyes of its most virulent opponents, the new Chinese law on work contracts risks striking a deadly blow against the country's economic vitality. Under the cover of wishing to protect the workers, it will only weaken the companies, society, and, in the end, the workers themselves.

Striking a more optimistic but equally politically correct note, in an article in 21 shiji jingji baodao Wang Dongjing suggests a method of increasing wages in order to stimulate domestic consumption. He reminds the reader that although raising wage levels is a popular cause, it is complicated because social harmony is involved and it is difficult for the State to take action on wages paid by private firms. Moreover, the prime beneficiaries must be the workers and peasants. In order to raise wage levels, he proposes that business taxes should be lowered. But what are the guarantees that lower business taxes would lead to increased wages?

To answer this complex set of problems, Wang Dongjing proposes that the first step should be to increase the lowest wages, because that would inevitably set up an escalation, obliging the firms to raise the wages of all their employees in a natural process of overall readjustment. Last year's 30% increase in State revenue ought to make it absolutely possible to lower the taxes paid by private firms. According to his analysis, that is the only way of making a rise in wages conceivable without putting any restraint on the firms' prospects. But it also presupposes a legally fixed minimum wage for the lowest paid workers[4].

The articles that appeared at the end of the year in the general press in the PRC see a number of reasons for satisfaction with China’s diplomacy in 2007. These include an improvement in relations with the major powers of Asia (India); Africa (South Africa) and of course North America and Europe; a constructive engagement in the fight against climate change; a constructive mediation with regard to Iran and Darfur; participation in the Annapolis peace conference; effective management of the question of food security, and the protection of the workforce and Chinese interests abroad[1]. In addition to its successes which, according to Wen weipo, will be confirmed in the White Paper on Chinese diplomacy to be released in 2008, important progress has been made in Sino-Russian and Sino-Japanese relations, as well as in mobilising international support against Taiwan’s independence and its membership of the United Nations and the World Health Organisation.

A more worrying and critical voice can also be heard, however. Shi Yinhong, at the same time as being pleased with the 2007 results, is concerned with the “complexification” of the international situation and the inability of Chinese diplomacy to face up to “the emergence of new problems which are developing, diversifying and spreading at a growing rate”. Economic and trade questions are on the agenda, such as food security, the issue of exchange rates and the Chinese sovereign fund. All this is happening in the context of a slowdown in America’s economic growth, record highs on the world’s oil markets and an inflationary trend in China. This is contributing to the politicisation of economic issues, and does not make relations with the United States and the European Union any simpler. Although the Sino-American dialogue is constructive, “it has not managed to temper the protectionist tendency of the United States”. This tendency, noted by Shi Yinhong, is accompanied, according to Tang Yongsheng, by a return of power politics. The change in the international system to one based on globalised capitalism cannot avoid having growing recourse to power relations, even if such a move has already shown on numerous occasions that it is incapable of resolving international problems (as in Iraq and Afghanistan). Nonetheless, according to Tang, the great danger associated with this capitalist configuration is financial instability. As financial power is concentrated in the hands of only a few countries, any crisis will have a disproportionate impact on developing countries, in so far as instability will have repercussions on flawed financial systems as well as affecting social and political stability.

According to Shi, the danger in having multiple financial and trade relations does not, however, lie in financial crisis; rather, it would come from the actors in this new global set-up. For these commercial and financial reasons, as indeed for problems such as climate change, or the attention given by the media to the Olympic Games or the Dalai-Lama, the great challenge for China is the relation between government and non-government actors. China’s diplomacy is no longer dealing only with governments in a bilateral (or even multilateral) context. It must now also deal with NGOs, trade organisations, and civil and consumer associations, which means that it has to take account of international public opinion. “International civil society” can call upon rapid and effective means of communication and people-to-people interaction, and can successfully mobilise the media and public opinion. The resources of Chinese diplomacy are inadequate to deal with this new situation.

This international civil society is not, however, the only “complicated” factor looming in 2008. The Taiwanese question is mentioned by Tang as a likely problem China needs to prepare for, but one that it can resolve. As Shi Yinhong sees it, this involves two dilemmas that could come to the surface in 2008. The one is that China must find a middle path between taking excessively strong measures of dissuasion (political or military) and having too weak a capacity for intimidation in the face of a possible declaration of independence by Taiwan. The other dilemma facing China concerns reunification, with respect to which it should be careful not to act either too quickly or too slowly. The Presidential election to be held on the island in 2008 could bring about a reaction by China, which is, implicitly, judged to be premature.

Shi Yinhong also views with concern China’s place in Asia faced with the prospect of a new American diplomatic offensive in the region. He says that the United States seems once again to be mindful of the importance of what is happening in Asia, following an initial “weariness” in the wake of 9/11. In spite of the diplomatic and military resources being devoted to the fight against international terrorism and to the Middle East, the United States is fully capable of deploying other diplomatic means (“supple and flexible”, 柔性, rouxing) to win back lost ground in Asia. Already in 2007, it succeeded in strengthening its position with regard to Korea, India, Mongolia, Pakistan and the Asean countries. The position of China, however, is “stagnating” and even being blocked by difficulties which are undermining relations between it and North Korea and bringing about a weakening of Beijing’s influence on Pyongyang[2]. Its relations with South Korea are “neither hot nor cold”, there is a slowing down of initiatives in South-East Asia, and difficulties have arisen as a result of internal disturbances in Myanmar. Despite a relative improvement in relations with Japan, the situation in Asia poses a risk of becoming more complicated for China in 2008.

Shi Yinhong also notes some gains in China’s African policy, as well as in its energy diplomacy and even in terms of military development. But the international situation is such that even these gains have not been without dubious effects. Military modernisation is reviving concerns about a “(future) Chinese threat”, but Shi wonders whether the spirited reactions on the part of American strategists, generals and of course neo-conservatives do not come from the fact that the Chinese army is finally beginning to present a real challenge, which would explain why “nerves are frayed” in the United States…

The basic point alluded to by Shi is the response of China’s diplomacy. Thanks to a rhetorical subtlety, he manages to criticise and warn in a politically correct way. China has to take account of the rapid changes to the international system. It cannot let itself be limited by its gains or by the thinking behind them. “What constituted success a generation ago could be the cause of failure in a generation’s time”. It is therefore possible that the postulates of the 16th Central Committee concerning a “period of strategic opportunity” and “peaceful development” are no longer in step with the change in the international political situation and its major trends.

This edition of Xiandai guoji guanxi acknowledges first that the change in China-Europe relations is one of the manifestations of a change in the international order. It is characterised by a “complexification” (复杂化, fuzahua): a transition from a relationship based essentially on economic and trade interactions to a dense fabric of strategic dossiers[1], with the potential for greater discord. The two writers draw different conclusions, however. Feng Zhongping defends the classic point of view according to which the divisions within the EU over the approach to be taken towards China will prevent it from reaching the strategic targets it has set for itself. He adds that a harder attitude on trade matters on the part of the Europeans would only result in obstacles to the development of harmonious bilateral relations. This is one way of confirming that it is not up to the EU to determine the agenda for its relationship with China, and that any attempt to force China’s hand will be counterproductive. Li Yonghui, on the other hand, adopts an approach that is more pessimistic for China. He believes that there are growing elements of competition within a bilateral relationship that is nevertheless defined as a cooperative one, as European foreign policy becomes consolidated. He perceives that a stronger Europe will pose a risk to China-Europe relations. These two theses are a reminder that China views itself as relatively more powerful than Europe at the level of the bilateral relationship.

For Feng Zhongping, the main strategic objective of the Europeans today is to ensure that China becomes a “constructive participant” (建设性的参与者, jianshexing de canyuzhe) in the emerging new multilateral world order. In practice, this means involving it in solving and managing strategic regional and global problems such as global warming or the fight against environmental degradation. However, in his opinion this effort to engage China conflicts with the increasingly harder attitude on the part of the Europeans towards trade matters[2], which has a negative effect on the harmonious growth of bilateral relations, since it is an approach doomed to failure. For Feng Zhongping, the example of Europe-Russia relations shows that Europe is incapable of going beyond an approach anchored in realpolitik. In seeking to transform Russia and to encourage its progress towards a democratic system and free society, it hit a brick wall. Even worse, it realised that in attempting to criticise, isolate or sanction Russia, it was only creating problems of energy security and economic security. Is Europe then condemned to weakness?

Feng Zhongping’s response is clear. The increasing complexity of China-Europe relations is at present an obstacle in the path of the EU’s attainment of its strategic objectives. This is because it leads the EU to be overly demanding on matters in which China will refuse to make any concession, leading to differences that affect the whole of the relationship. At the same time, the message from the Europeans has only very limited impact because of internal disagreements. Admittedly, the Treaty of Lisbon is strengthening the EU’s capacity to pursue its common foreign and security policy (CFSP)[3]. But as long as the system of a unanimous vote remains in place for the fundamental decisions of the CFSP, Feng Zhongping wagers that the EU will not be capable of developing a level of political influence commensurate with its economic weight.

The argument proposed by Li Yonghui is based on quite a different logic. He believes that China must rethink its definition of the emerging new world order. While China has for a decade been repeating its theory of “one superpower, many powers” (一超多强, yichao duoqiang), the world is moving more towards a configuration where China, would hold a place of “quasi-superpower” (准超级大国, zhun chaoji daguo), between the superpower that is the US and the various other world powers. As a consequence, Europe, which has correctly recognised the new dimension to China’s power, is entering a phase of intense speculation, re-examining its view of China and attempting to redefine the shape of China-Europe relations. It is a strategic turning-point with, for China, the risk that Europe may define it as a “strategic competitor” rather than a partner. The trends in this direction are already apparent, notably in Germany[4]. According to Li Yonghui, they have a psychological basis: China’s rise in power is prompting fear in Europe of a “new marginalisation” (再次被边缘化, zaici bei bianyuanhua), after its eclipse behind the United States following World War II. Concrete concerns are feeding this vague feeling of fear: the activation of sovereign Chinese capital, or China’s activities in Africa, often considered in Europe to be a form of colonialism.

In particular, Li Yonghui is one of the first observers to consider that the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, which is accelerating the unification of Europe and its democratisation, constitutes a potentially negative factor in the development of China-Europe relations (to be understood as a potential threat to Chinese interests). In his view, “what we used to consider a trend favourable to the birth of a multipolar world, that is, the unification of Europe, is having undesirable effects on China-Europe relations, which are becoming more apparent daily”. All the more so since this consolidation is taking place in a context in which at least two factors could precipitate a deterioration of bilateral relations.

First, the fight against climate change, a matter in which Europe is trying to take on the mantle of world leader. Chinese and European perceptions on this point are so different that there is considerable potential for dispute, since it is probably the matter in which the political weight of the Union will be the greatest. Secondly, China and the EU do not have conflicting security interests. Europe is consequently not particularly dependent on China for its security. In these circumstances, it will not sacrifice any of its economic interests to preserve its security interests (in other words, unlike the US), which limits China’s room to manoeuvre. While it could be concluded that this lack of dependence is a potential asset for Europe, for this Chinese academic it represents a structural obstacle to the harmonious development of bilateral economic relations.

The 12 January 2008 legislative elections brought a brutal end to a twenty year increase in the “green” vote and inflicted a historic defeat on the DPP[1]. In 2001, President Chen’s group obtained its highest score in an election and became the leading party based on numbers of seats, though it still did not hold an absolute majority[2]. Today, the DPP has declined in all of the electoral districts, including the seven districts and towns where it had harnessed more than 52% of the vote in the 2004 legislative elections.

Continuing his analysis on a tactical level, Lin Cho-shui notes that Chen Shui-bian’s error (Chen Shui-bian having led the campaign by sweeping aside all sectors of public opinion, and relying simultaneously on independence-unification rhetoric, a campaign of strong “de-Chinafication”[4] and the island’s admission to the UN[5]) was to select candidates whose positions were too extreme. Considering that “independentism” had become one of the central values of the Taiwanese political landscape, he chose to rely on this ideologically-won constituency, estimated at 38%. The strategy proved to be ineffective in the context of the new ballot process. On the contrary, even though the Kuomintang benefited from its very high local foothold, he worked on uniting his camp and muzzling the most conservative factions in its ranks in order to gain renewed popularity for the localist trend (本土派, bentupai) as in the time of Lee Tenghui[6], and capable of winning over the centrist constituency. Shih Cheng-feng, an academic specialising in national identity and close to the independentists, is of the same mind as Lin Cho-shui and sees the break with the Taiwan Solidarity Union (台灣團結聯盟, Taiwan tuanjie lianmeng), provoked by an excess of authoritarianism by the DPP (大哥欺負小弟的惡霸作為, dage qifu xiaodi de eba zuowei), as one of the determining factors in the defeat.

At the moment of reckoning of the legislative elections, the main question, which continues to preoccupy the political class today, is whether the absolute majority obtained by the KMT in the Parliament could pose an obstacle to the victory of the candidate Ma Ying-jeou in the March 2008 presidential election.

The idea echoed in the articles is that a swing of the pendulum (鐘擺效應, zhongba xiaoying) is not impossible. Scared by the extent of the recent victory of the KMT, as Philip Yang and the China Times editorial note, or moved by a sentiment of compassion, characteristic of Taiwanese culture, after the harshness of the defeat suffered by the DPP, as Yang Tai-shun points out, the centrist voters could shift their vote to Hsieh Chang-ting.

Philip Yang considers such a swing of the pendulum both unlikely and undesirable. Describing the fear of the return of an all-powerful KMT as irrational, and confronted with the difficult matter of relations between the two shores, he considers it essential that there be strong presidential leadership in Taiwan; its absence would result in an immobility that would be damaging to the Taiwanese people’s confidence in democracy. Yang Tai-shun, who emphasises that the KMT now holds a sufficient majority to dismiss the President of the Republic, shows how the DPP has tried without success to awaken the old fears concerning the Chinese authoritarian past of the KMT through its campaign of “de-Chinafication”. He believes that the substantial victory shows that the KMT can now unashamedly wear its identity before the electorate.

For Shih Cheng-feng, the swing of the pendulum could nevertheless happen, but on several conditions. Hsieh Chang-ting must first stop fuelling confusion over his mainland policy, a strategy developed with the obj