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DOMESTIC POLITICS 1. The “Chinese miracle” and the challenge of Tibet 2. New ministries, at the expense of the NDRC? 3. Major changes within the central planning apparatus ECONOMY 4. Tax revenues and the standards of public service 5. The invasion of the “green” buildings DIPLOMATIC AND STRATEGIC AFFAIRS 6. An international order based on joint US-China domination? 7. The UN under Ban Ki-Moon, a positive turning point for Beijing? 8. Intellectual property: China has to defend its interests TAIWAN 9. A modus vivendi in the Taiwan strait?
Information - registration: chinaanalysis@centreasia.org
Extract and translated from the French E-bulletin China Analysis – Les Nouvelles de Chine n°18, Mar.–Apr. 2008, pp.3-5
French Editor: M.Duchâtel/M.Meidan. Translation: Peter brown
Mathieu Duchâtel
From :
– Li Ping, Li Yajie, “What lies underneath the orchestration by the Dalai-lama’s of Tibet’s great insurrection movement”, Xinhua agency, 1st April 2008.
– Cao Xin, “An alternative view of the question of Tibet”, Nanfang zhoumo, 2nd April 2008.
Can China ease its policy towards Tibet? A perusal of the official Chinese press gives little cause for optimism. Since the beginning of the unrest on 14 March, Beijing has marshalled its propaganda machine to conduct a veritable information war. Beijing’s official line – accusing the “Dalai Lama’s clique” of sliding into violence and seeking independence that run counter to the economic development that has been enabled by China’s policies – is relentlessly hammered out in China and abroad. The closing off to outsiders of the Special Administrative Region prevents any alternative view being put forward, just as it does any measure of the scale of repression. The Chinese press has overwhelmingly rejected having any debate on the underlying causes of the riots. Our selection sets two contrasting pieces side by side. One is an article from the Xinhua agency, which sets out in detail for Chinese readers the government’s arguments about a plot. This piece is based on the core argument, often contested abroad, that the Dalai Lama and his government in exile directly control the pro-independence groups. Conversely, the article from Nanfang zhoumo is a notable exception, as it relates the Tibetan riots to China’s cultural policy in the region. It is proof that this argument, which is unanimously accepted abroad, has currency in Chinese liberal circles...
China’s whole argument is based on a denunciation of the Dalai Lama’s plans for independence, whereas he himself has continually repeated his demands for increased autonomy, in line with the Constitution of the Republic of China[1]. According to the Xinhua agency, the Dalai Lama’s government in exile decided at a meeting in Brussels in March 2007 to seize the occasion of the Olympic Games in order to bring about a crisis and draw the world’s attention to the Tibetan cause. Concretely, the events in Tibet in March are said to be the result of an alliance between the Dalai Lama’s forces and the most radical organisations calling for independence, that is, the congress of young Tibetans, the association of Tibetan women, and the movement of free Tibetan students… These unveiled to the United States their plan for a “great movement of insurrection by the Tibetan people” (西藏人民大起义运动, xizang renmin da qiyi yundong). The plan began with the principle that 2008 is the “last chance for success” for the independence of Tibet. In India, pro-independence groups drew up a series of specific measures and obtained the backing of the government in exile. This was first of a whole series of political demands, which, from China’s perspective, went well beyond calls for autonomy. They included, for example, the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet, the departure of the Chinese settlers, the freeing of political prisoners… In the case of China’s refusal to give in to its demands, the plan is said to make provision for resorting to violence. Its instigators are not concerned to cloak themselves in mystery or secrecy; indeed, seven pro-independence associations set out the main thrust of these plans at two press conferences in New Delhi in January 2008. The insurrection, to be launched in March 2008, was to constitute a “historic turning-point in Tibet’ s struggle for freedom”.
Two dates were to mark the rise of Tibetan protest. Outside of China, on March 19th, the congress of young Tibetans launched a peaceful march planned to end up in the Special Administrative Region. Overseas Tibetans in other countries took a day off work to undertake various actions such as demonstrations, strikes and attacks against the Embassies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In “Greater Tibet” – the Special Administrative Region and those parts of historical Tibet that have been attached to the provinces of Gansu, Sichuan and Qinghai –, the riots began on 14th March. Still according to the official Chinese agency, the Security Ministry of the government in exile has been playing a key role in coordinating operations as well as being in charge of intelligence. In order to counter the deployment by China of effective security measures, it is thought to have decided on March 17th to repatriate to Dharamsala the most active elements in the riots. The rest of the article tries to prove the role of the government in exile, beginning with the arrest of an anonymous Tibetan, who was supposedly entrusted with clandestine missions by the Ministry of Security, notably the setting up in Tibet of a network of informants, collection of intelligence data and the distribution of tracts on the Dalai Lama’s activities abroad. According to the article, Chinese public security officials found compromising documents at his home, including reports and photos of the riots that he was preparing to send to the Tibetan security services.
Like all official sources, the Xinhua agency piece reveals a certain sense of amazement at the riots. How can the fact that Tibetans are not satisfied with the economic development of their region be explained? Given access to the outside by a railway line, the region is benefiting from China’s growth. China’s whole public communication machinery is based on a black-and-white opposition between the ideologues of the pro-independence movement and the pragmatists of development. The Nanfang zhoumo is quite alone in the media landscape in looking for a possible cause for the insurrection in the policies of China itself.
For the newspaper from Guangdong province, the power of religion in daily life in Tibet and the population’s veneration of the Dalai Lama are two unavoidable realities. China would do better to face up to this, by referring to its Constitution. Instead of perceiving the Tibetan leader as a political threat and trying to deligitimise him, it should, however reluctantly, accept the need to treat him as a religious leader. The relative insolence of such a statement is attenuated by the call for strict respect for the PRC’s internal law. But the Nanfang zhoumo calls for a veritable strategic shift, by asking the Chinese government to distinguish between the foreign Tibetan groups rather than rejecting them wholesale. Thus, it would not be counter-productive for Beijing to adopt a policy of “smiling to dissipate antagonisms” (相逢一笑泯恩仇, xiangfeng yixiao min enchou) towards the Tibetans living in exile who followed the Dalai Lama when he fled to India in 1959. They are not all pro-independence supporters. In fact, they belong to a complex society that has undergone much change in the intervening period. Similarly, in the “Dalai Lama’s clique”, China would do better to make a distinction between those who support non-violence and are asking for autonomy and extremists advocating violence as a means to independence.
But the Nanfang zhoumo goes even further, since it implicitly denounces any connection between the policy of the Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CP) in the region, Zhang Qingli, appointed in 2006, and the March riots. China should perhaps draw inspiration from the management methods of Guo Jinlong, the Mayor of Beijing, who was the Party’s secretary-general in the Autonomous Region of Tibet from 2000 to 2004, and whose moderate policies had fostered stability. In particular, he had guaranteed religious freedom for all – Party members excepted – and drew a line between normal ethnic and religious activities and “separatist” actions. While many facets of Tibetan religious life are in tune with the Chinese dream to build a “harmonious society”, why not, as Chinese experts themselves say, build new relations with Tibetans on that basis? Buddhism, in Tibet, does not encourage “extremist” behaviour. According to the South China weekly, this means that Tibet must “be treated differently from the other regions dominated by ethnic minorities”. Without calling directly for dialogue, the Nanfang zhoumo proposes a reworking of China’s political line with respect to Tibet. It recalls that the Dalai Lama published in the Western media on March 28th an “open letter to [his] Chinese brothers and sisters”, in which he undertook not to support independence and to oppose any boycott of the Beijing Olympics. These promises perfectly match the requirements set down by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao for a return to dialogue.
[1]. The principle of the autonomy of the Special Administrative Regions is laid down in section 6 of the Constitution of the PRC. The equality of nationalities in China is guaranteed by article 4 of the Constitution.
Extract and translated from the French E-bulletin China Analysis – Les Nouvelles de Chine n°18, Mar.–Apr. 2008, pp.5-6
French Editor: M.Duchâtel/M.Meidan. Translation: Peter brown
Michal Meidan
From:
– Zuo Qingling, Ye Feng, Teng Xiaomeng, Wang Xiaoming, “Addition and Subtraction in the Super Ministries: five ministries, three definitions and six months”, 21 Shiji jingji baodao, 1st April 2008.
– Zhang Fengan, “The bureaux responsible for the ‘Great Western Development Strategy’ and the policy of ‘Revitalising the North-East’ are being absorbed into a new regional management structure”, 21 Shiji jingji baodao, 28 March 2008.
Following the March session of the National People’s Congress (NPC), the role of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) (发改委, fagaiwei) has been redefined, with the establishment of five new ministries. Besides the Environment Ministry, whose creation, much debated in the Chinese and international press, elevates the State Environmental Protection Agency (Sepa) to the rank of Ministry, the four other “Super Ministries” are Industry and Information, Human Resources and Social Security, Housing and Rural and Urban Construction, and Transport. However, the emphasis given in the Chinese press to the “contraction” of the NDRC’s functions implies that the ministerial reorganisation is as much designed to curtail the role of this all-powerful administration as it is to rationalise management practices in the areas concerned[1]...
The creation of the five new ministries is also designed to send a message to public opinion, worried about the erosion of living standards. This is that the government is taking on board the needs of the population in terms of housing, education and health, and, above all, that it is striving to adopt more rational and transparent management practices. The definition of the responsibilities of each ministry has not yet been finalised. In fact, only the Ministry of Housing and Rural and Urban Construction, replacing the Ministry of Construction, is thought to have completed, at the end of March, the process of the “three definitions” (三定, san ding) - concerning the Ministry’s internal structure, its organisation and its areas of responsibility - and to have submitted these “definitions” for approval to the State Council and the Central Organisation Department of the Communist Party. The new Ministry should have more authority over questions of housing, including the formulation of housing policy, its financing and taxation, as well as the distribution of land. On the other hand, the planning and construction of new urban public transport facilities should be allocated to the new Ministry of Transport. However, the allocation of other responsibilities, such as the management of urban tourist sites, the administration of parks and woods and the management of water resources, is still to be settled. The management of towns and villages is currently in the hands of “administrative work units” (事业单位, shiye danwei), but it should eventually be transferred to the Ministry for Housing.
The other ministries, according to the information provided by 21 Shiji jingji baodao, have six months in which to present their “three definitions” to the State Council. The Environment Ministry should, unlike Sepa out of which it has evolved, play an important role in the definition of policies to be adopted, and take an active part in research and decision-making about new government strategies, even if “the question of how to take part remains unresolved”. It should also have more authority over the implementation and enforcement of laws, which was until now Sepa’s primary function. Although the definition of roles is currently being worked out, according to “well-informed sources” the information given by journalists from the liberal newspaper in the south of the country relates to some major difficulties being experienced in attempts to arrive at a clear definition of the Environment Ministry’s areas of responsibility. Some fundamental questions arise: should the management of water resources, both freshwater and seawater, come under the control of this Ministry?; what supervisory and management mechanisms would have to be set up?; will it be independent – as advocated by “certain analysts” who are at ministerial level – and endowed with a vertical management system that takes account of all regions and industries? It would appear that the only point of agreement is to provide this Ministry with a more important role than the one Sepa had in terms of research and policy development.
The process involved in this reorganisation does not affect only the new ministries. According to the journalists cited, a number of ministries, including the Ministry of Trade, have set up internal working groups to reexamine their structures and areas of responsibility with a view to redefining them. There remains “the question whether this reorganisation can bring about an effective power sharing and a clear definition of roles and responsibilities, with a devolution of power to local governments, businesses and middle organisations”. The new dispensation of the NDRC is thus the key. With a new Minister in charge, the NDRC should now confine itself to macroeconomic regulation. It should shed its microeconomic functions and, above all, its power to intervene in the process of granting approvals and licenses. Some of its functions should be transferred to the Ministry of Industry and Information; other responsibilities, including, in particular, the authority to approve projects, should be handed down to lower echelons. The issue of regulating prices has not, however, been broached. The NDRC will also be charged with the coordination of regional policies. Zhang Fengan points out that the bureaux affiliated to the leading groups within the State Council which are responsible for the so-called “Great Western Development Strategy” and the “Revitalising the North-east” policy will come under the NDRC’s portfolio. Although the details of this have not yet been worked out, all the people cited by the writers are promising that this change will not have any negative impact on the implementation of these regional initiatives and that, on the contrary, it will enable their more effective and integrated management.
The great unknown therefore remains the new nature of the NDRC itself. Wei Jianing, the Deputy-Director of the Department of Macroeconomic Research in the Research Centre attached to the State Council, thinks that the fact that this body was intervening in such a great many issues, some of them involving a conflict of interests, was prejudicial to its operation. It remains to be seen, however, whether this new reform will lead to the rationalisation of institutions so longed for by China’s leaders.
Extract and translated from the French E-bulletin China Analysis – Les Nouvelles de Chine n°18, Mar.–Apr. 2008, pp.9-11
French Editor: M.Duchâtel/M.Meidan. Translation: Jonathan Hall
THIBAUD VOÏTA
From:
- Li Junpeng, "Important points in the administrative reforms in China"; Zhang Qianfang, "We must first reform the system and open it up", Caijing, no. 204, February 4th 2008.
- Chen Zhiwu, "How big is the government?", Jingji Guancha Bao (The Economic Observer), February 25th 2008.
With the approaching meeting of the National People's Congress, a considerable number of debates on administration in China have found their way into the press. These articles focus on three criticisms. Chen Zhiwu, a professor of finance at Yale, takes a liberal view which is palpably influenced by the United States. He considers the question of "big government" and mounts his attack on the management of public funds in China. For his part, Li Junpeng, a professor at the Chinese National School of Administration, unleashes a diatribe against China's public services. Finally, Zhang Qianfan, a professor of Constitutional Law at Beijing University, emphasises the lack of transparency in China's administration. It is striking how many references Chen and Zhang make to the US administration...
Firstly, Chen highlights the size of China's tax revenues. In 2007, these amounted to 5,100 billion yuan (31% higher than the previous year), the equivalent of 21% of the country's GDP. To this source of income should be added the government's other sources. The first of these is land, whose potential taxation value is reckoned to be 5,000 billion yuan. Next in line are the State enterprises, of which there are currently thought to be 119,000, with shares which should provide an overall tax income of 2,900 billion yuan[1]. If the revenue generated in 2007 by the State-owned assets is added to the public finances, this gives a global figure of 15,700 billion yuan. Finally, the total value of the State-owned shares is 88 billion yuan.
In Chen's view the situation is getting worse. Up until 1978, the government took care of everyone from the cradle to the grave. Then, from 1978 until 1995, China underwent a period of "small government, big society" ( , , xiaozhengfu, dashehui), which reached its height in 1995. After 1995, the tax reforms of 1993-1994 reversed the trend. These reforms consisted in sharing responsibilities for taxation with the local authorities (in this area power was devolved "downwards": , xiafang). But the responsibilities were too loosely defined, and the local authorities were given too great a margin for manoeuvre.
Insert 1. Changes in the number of people subject to taxation in China, 1978-2004
Year Number of taxable rural inhabitants Number of taxable urban residents
(in millions)
1978 850 330
1985 500 270
1995 390 146
2004 900 280
Between 1995 and 2007, the amount of inflation-adjusted tax revenue rose by 16% annually, which was more than the 10.2% increase in GDP for the same period. Moreover, Chen recognises that these figures do not take into account the income excluded from local government budgets. There is no doubt that this makes the situation considerably worse[2].
This raises two problems. Firstly, out of the total number of Chinese shares, valued at 115,600 billion yuan (according to the National Development and Reform Commission), only 27.6% (roughly a third) are in the hands of the private sector. Secondly, the people do not get enough benefit from the services offered by the State, since expenditure on social service provision is very low, even in comparison with the United States (see Insert 2). Li stresses that in some cases it is even falling.
Insert 2. A comparison of social services expenditure in China and the United States in the same year[3] (in yuans and dollars: 100 yuan = 14.3 dollars; 1 dollar = appr. 7 yuan).
China (in yuan) The USA (in dollars)
Social services expenditure 600 billion yuan 1,500 billion dollars
Percentage of public expenditure 15% 61%
Percentage of GDP 2.4% 11.5%
Sum paid to each recipient 461 yuan 5,000 dollars
Percentage of average wage 3% 18%
Unlike Chen, Li does not focus on the size of the government. Just as Chen follows the American model, with its main objective of reducing the role of government, so Li follows the alternative, with its pursuit of improvements to existing institutions without questioning socialism with Chinese characteristics. As a result his article is full of ideologically loaded terms, whose connotations are frequently impossible to translate.
He identifies several so-called "contradictions" (the famous , maodun). Despite a flourishing administration, the people harvest very little fruit from the public services. At the same time, their needs are constantly growing, while becoming more complex and demanding. But the social services reach only very few. Out of 764 million economically active people, only 24.56% will enjoy a pension from public funds, 14.64% can count on unemployment benefits, and 20.59% will receive state social security. The increase in revenue accruing to the administration has not been matched by investments which might benefit the population at large. On the contrary, the administration continues to thrive while its expenditure on social services is not increasing.
This situation is all the more fraught with problems because the expectations of those who use the public services are continually rising, and in addition there is a new factor: they expect the services to be more democratic. They are demanding greater insight into their workings, plus higher levels of public participation, and speedier reforms. What is needed is a more rapid movement towards setting up an enlightened and responsible democratic government ( , minzhu zhengfu, yuanguan zhengfu he zeren zhengfu). Administrative reforms are seen to be unorganised. A consistent commitment to changing the way the Chinese government operates must lead on to improvements in the socialist market economy system ( , shehuizhuyi shichang jingjitizhi) and in the system of socialist public administration ( , shehuizhuyi gongong xingzhengfu tizhi).
Li propose five reforms, along the following lines:
1. A redistribution of powers in favour of the National People's Congress, particularly in exercising control over administrative waste (here Li agrees with Chen).
2. Drawing up a plan for redistributing expenditure in favour of the public services (education, health, social security), with a yearly increase of 1% of their share of the GDP.
3. Administrative reforms, with some branches being cut back while others are given "expanded responsibilities exercised by a small number of institutions" ( , kuangzhineng shaojigou), the latter applying particularly to agriculture, transport, culture, and science and technology[4].
4. Holding the administration to account through systems of assessment and incentive rewards.
5. A reform in the methods of reform. The principle of the administration reforming itself does not lead to efficiency. Political leaders, society at large, and government organisations must all take part.
Lastly, Zhang's view is that, in addition to all these problems, the administration is undermined by its own lack of transparency.
These are the general lines of debate which were advanced in the recent meeting of the National People's Congress, and the creation of large ministries is their practical application. But the Chinese administration still appears to be the inheritor of the centralised planning system, with its cadres who are often hostile to changes and local authorities who evade central control. It has not managed to adapt to the country's economic, social, and demographic changes. Apart from some formal changes to institutions, such an adaptation will probably take a good deal longer.
[1] This estimate was provided by the chairman of the State Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, in an interview with the journal Qiu Shi, published in August 2007 and quoted in Chen's article.
[2] For these matters of local taxation, see the works of Christine C. P. Wong, and particularly the recent work by Christine C. P. Wong and Richard M. Bird, "China's Fiscal System: A Work in Progress", International Tax Program Paper 0515, Institute of International Business, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, Toronto University, 2005, 42 pages.
[3] "Social services expenditure" here means State expenditure on health-care, social security, and unemployment benefits. It should also be noted that Chen compares yuans with dollars.
[4] This idea will crop up again a few weeks later, in the debate on the creation of "large ministries" during the meeting of the National People's Congress.
Extract and translated from the French E-bulletin China Analysis – Les Nouvelles de Chine n°18, Mar.–Apr. 2008, pp.14-16
French Editor: M.Duchâtel/M.Meidan. Translation: Peter brown
Mathieu Duchâtel
From:
– Huang He, Zhu Zao, “On the possibilities of joint China-US domination”, Xiandai guoji guanxi, n° 2, February 2008
Chinese specialists of international relations have long followed the policy of their government by calling for the advent of a new international order based on multipolarity. However, for some time now, it has seemed obvious that the postulate on which this perspective rested is no longer valid. Rather than seeing the future of China as being equal to that of the European Union, Russia, Japan, Brazil or India, all pillars of the future multipolar international system, these scholars have begun to talk about China as a “virtual superpower” having already outstripped all other states to close the gap on the power of the United States[1]. It is on this postulate that Huang He and Zhu Zao base their approach in exploring a new possibility for a future international order, that of joint China-US domination (中美共主, zhongmei gongzhu). The question is whether China and the United States can share in the domination of the international system in a harmonious and cooperative way...
Without enquiring into the feasibility of this state of affairs, the two authors propose specific changes to adapt the concept of “hegemonic stability”. In their estimation, regulation of the international system by Washington and Beijing is justified for the good of the world. Indeed, without leadership the system is incapable of distributing and preserving “community property” needed by all the world’s states for their well-being and development, such as peace, a stable monetary environment and the opening up of markets, but also the essential goods of daily life. Their work is centred on the search for a middle way between the theories of neo-liberalism and neo-realism. On the one hand, they think that hegemony is positive from the viewpoint of community property, but that the provision of this community property cannot bypass institutions and cooperation between states. On the other hand, their strategic culture is realistic, without a trace of ambiguity. The hegemony they have in mind for China is based on the search for power, and they call for an international system in line with Chinese interests.
The argument in favour of a new form of hegemonic stability is a clever one. Both authors are of the view that the United States has, in recent years, gradually gone from having a willingness to have a “hegemonic stability” (霸权稳定论, baquan wending lun) to an attempt to have “unilateral stability” (单极稳定, danji wending). This shift has shown itself by the fact that the views that had accompanied the emergence of the concept of hegemonic stability - the end of history, the end of world wars, peace through exchanges and democratic peace - have all been abandoned. All that has remained of the initial theoretical proposals is the desire for increased stability by means of unilateral action, including war. In actual fact, the two authors critique the neo-realist version of the concept of hegemonic stability according to which the international system and its institutions are defended by the dominant state only on condition that it is in its own interest to do so, which was not the case in the eyes of the Bush administration.
They conclude form this that there is an incompatibility between unilateral means and a search for stability, as hegemony must be in the service of a project that is of benefit for humanity. Furthermore, it must be grounded in institutions and cooperation. The United States, conscious of the fact that the Bush administration took the wrong path early on, has again made popular the notion of “sharing responsibilities” in maintaining the international order. The awareness that American hegemony could not last without partnerships has led Washington to rethink its foreign policy. In the future, therefore, American diplomatic initiatives should be driven more by neo-liberalism.
China must make the most of this opportunity, for the consolidation of the established order, in partnership with the United States, is in China’s interest. The present international system has ensured that it has sufficient room for development, and it has been the condition sine qua non of this development. Maintaining the status quo by developing it in a way more favourable to China’s interests is the result of an “internal need” (内在需要, neizai xuyao), or, in other words, of the Chinese demand for a stable world in which it can become richer. It is interesting to note that the writers make this appeal for the building of a new order in the guise of a profoundly revisionist discourse. In order to strengthen the international system, China must first of all call upon rhetorical means. It must better promote the notion of “harmonious world” and construct a “power of discourse” (话语权, huayu quan), essential in the sphere of international relations.
This will not be enough, however, as the United States has the responsibility for taking the initiative in dealing with the world’s problems – the writers cite regulation of the financial system, contagious illnesses and climate change – that it cannot solve either unilaterally or through already existing partnerships. Furthermore, from the standpoint of international security conceived in military terms, “the new challenges in international relations cannot be met through classical alliances or coalitions”. Indeed, by 2020, “weapons of mass destruction will be more widespread than today”, which will limit the possibility for the United States to deploy its military might unilaterally. In order to strengthen international stability, the United States needs another state capable of exercising real leadership (主导能力, zhudao nengli) on certain key issues.
In practice, the two Greats need to develop an institutional mechanism to manage world affairs together. The factors driving them to go forward in this way have to do with a classical view of power in a realist culture: a strong incentive to avoid bilateral conflict and to stabilise their relations in a lasting way; above all, this alliance would be a way of averting the cycle of rise and decline. With a bilateral institution, the relative power of the United States and China compared with the rest of the world would be consolidated, and for each of the two states this would avoid – or delay – the decline which, according to realist theories of the cyclical nature of power, is sooner or later the lot of any hegemonic power.
Once this bilateral structure is set up, its priority would be to prevent the “profiteering” behaviour (搭便车, da bianche) of certain states enjoying the status quo without contributing to its proper working. In order to ensure a fair distribution of community property, Washington and Beijing would sign agreements with the other states setting out the responsibilities of each one, so that the costs and benefits can be better shared by all. The new system foresees an important role for the states with particular capabilities that would be of benefit to humanity. By dint of the very large number of “common goods”, different types of agreements can be imagined. For example, it is thought that the United States and China would themselves ensure the distribution of certain goods, whilst the contribution of other states to the production of this common wealth or to guaranteeing access to it could take diverse forms (capital, human resources, know-how, investment in infrastructure).
In order to raise the capital necessary for the organisation of this new system of distribution and guarantee of the common wealth of humanity, both writers propose to make simultaneous use of three methods. Besides applying the Tobin tax and redirecting the development aid of the richest countries to this cause, they foresee a specific role for the new China-US institution that they are calling for. It would mean persuading the states to behave in a way that is conducive to the production of goods for the whole of the international community. The writers give one example of this: to persuade the states who sign bilateral trade agreements to insert clauses in favour of the protection of the environment, for example by banning the sale of certain manures despite the lobbying of agricultural firms. To stay within international relations theory, the theory of structural realism provides that in case of a state or an alliance of states being tempted by hegemonic ambitions, a coalition of states would be formed to act as a counterbalance to it. Neither writer speculates further, however, about such a possibility.
Extract and translated from the French E-bulletin China Analysis – Les Nouvelles de Chine n°18, Mar.–Apr. 2008, pp.14-16
French Editor: M.Duchâtel/M.Meidan. Translation: Jonathan Hall
Mathieu Duchâtel
From:
- Chang Wu-yue, "How to talk to the other shore? First we need an internal agreement with the Green camp[1]", Lienhebao, March 23rd 2008.
- Lin Cho-shui, "One China ... Can this really be interpreted in different ways?", Lienhebao, March 31st 2008.
There is every reason to believe that Beijing will accept, at least for the time being, the modus vivendi proposed by President Ma Ying-jeou. This entails a less politicised, pragmatic management of cross-strait relations, based on an economic game plan with winners on both sides. Beijing's only demand is that the Taiwan government should recognise "the 1992 consensus"[2]. For his part, Ma Ying-jeou wishes to establish a framework for peaceful co-operation with China, without yielding any ground over Taiwanese sovereignty. His overtures to Beijing are based on the political line followed by Taipei in the early 1990s[3]. Then, at the cost of a formal commitment not to oppose unification on the condition that China became a democracy, Taipei had been able to negotiate certain technical agreements through the intermediaries in certain "officially unofficial talks". The new government now wishes to revive these talks[4]. But how long can this last? Academics and politicians writing for the Taiwan press say that China is getting ready for more flexible tactics, not a different strategy. So the durability of this modus vivendi is now the main question dominating future relations between the two sides.
[1] This term refers to the alliance of pro-independence parties, currently represented by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).
[2] Su Chi, who concedes that he invented the term "1992 consensus" to designate the negotiations conducted in Hong Kong in 1992, defines the consensus in question as follows: 1. With regard to the "one China" principle, each side may give oral expression to their own interpretation. 2. On Taipei's side, understanding the definition of one China refers to the resolution on "the meaning of One China" published by the National Unification Council on August 1st 1992 (unlike Ma Ying-jeou who prefers to refer to the Constitution). 3. As for the Communist Party, the authorities on both sides of the strait maintain the principle of One China, but agree not to discuss its meaning when they consult each other on technical issues. Source: Su Chi and Cheng An-kuo, "Yige Zhongguo, gezi biaoshu, gongshi de shishi" ("One China, several interpretations: the historical truth of the consensus"), National Policy Foundation, Taipei, revised edition, September 2006.
[3] Ma Ying-jeou, "A SMART Strategy for National Security", a speech to Taiwan's Association for the Promotion of National Security, February 26th 2006. Source: KMT News Network.
[4] These "officially unofficial negotiations" were carried on by associations under the guidance of the two governments. In Taiwan it was the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), and in China, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). Ma Ying-jeou has announced that he wishes to return to this model. While it is now certain that the SEF will resume its key position in Taiwan's mainland policy, it is not yet possible to dispel all doubts over the nature of its future counterpart in China: whether ARATS or other arrangements.
Chang Wu-yue observes that Ma Ying-jeou enjoys a mandate to negotiate for economic advantages with China, but that he needs to build up the domestic consensus in Taiwan in order to retain sufficient political lee-way to conduct such negotiations. In point of fact the 1992 consensus had a shaky foundation. Its only legal basis, on the Taiwanese side, was a resolution adopted in August 1992 by the National Unification Council, which is the only written text to use the formula of "One China, several interpretations" ( , yige Zhongguo gezi biaoshu). But during his second term in office, Chen Shui-bian made a violent attack on the National Unification Council, and tried to abolish it on the grounds that it was a leftover from the period of authoritarian rule. So to reactivate it now is not a viable political option. Consequently, on the Taiwanese side, the resumption of the dialogue has to rely on a new text, capable of forging an agreement shared by the people as a whole and by the various political forces. Chang Wu-yue proposes setting up a committee, open to the opposition, and a framework document setting out "directives for the peaceful development of cross-strait relations" ( , liang'an guanxi heping fazhan gangling).
Chang Wu-yue argues that the success of these technical negotiations depends upon the right combination of circumstances, so both Beijing and Taipei should pick the right moments in the light of their respective agendas. Clearly, China gives priority to the establishment of direct air links with Taiwan and to finding the formula for opening tourism to its citizens. On the Taiwanese side, such an opening would also depend on a certain number of unilateral measures, such as lifting the quota which limits investment by Taiwanese firms in China, allowing finance companies to expand their activities on the mainland, opening certain sectors of the Taiwanese economy to Chinese investments, and inviting Chinese journalists to cover current events in Taiwan.
Yet Chang Wu-yue remains cautious over the prospect of concrete developments in cross-strait relations. He believes that there will be no major step forward during Ma Ying-jeou's period in office, because the two sides will not be able to avoid the issue of the island's status for long. Even within the context of the "officially unofficial" dialogue, the signing of bilateral documents will in all probability come up against the highly sensitive problem of the correct naming of Taiwan and China. In fact, every negotiation could well be seen as a "postponement of the question of sovereignty". In the course of the negotiations between the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), the Chinese side will not fail to include formulae capable of being interpreted as an abandonment by Taiwan of its claims to sovereign status. In the same way the SEF will try to impose a wording which, if it were accepted by China, would amount to recognising Taiwanese sovereignty. Under these conditions, Ma Ying-jeou's formula of "mutual non-denial" is not tenable over the long term[1].
This is because the detente between China and Taiwan depends upon an unuttered precondition: to use the 1992 consensus without defining it, and without officially recognising the "One China, several interpretations" formulation. Lin Cho-shui, the former deputy of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and theoretician of the independence movement, shows that returning to the dialogue on the basis of the 1992 consensus represents a fake concession on China's part. He compares the way in which Beijing treats the sovereignty of the Republic of China to the penal code which, depending on the State in question, can limit the freedom of conscience (in the worst of totalitarian regimes), and the freedom of expression and of political activity. If Taipei limits itself to a freedom of political activity on the domestic scene, China can only patiently swallow its objections in a mixture of silence and, basically, of understanding the Taiwanese point of view. But on the other hand, "One China, several interpretations" does not commit China to anything on the international scene. Despite the supposed "consensus", Taipei cannot freely express to other States its own interpretation of "the nature of the One China" without provoking a rhetorical counter-attack from China. Similarly, despite the wishes often expressed by the Kuomintang (KMT) to its Chinese counterparts, China is not bound by the 1992 consensus to stop its obstructions of Taiwanese diplomacy.
Under these circumstances, if Ma Ying-jeou has only gained from Beijing the right to tell his electorate that Taiwan is a sovereign State - a right which he already had -, that amounts to saying that he has gained nothing. Moreover, China may at any moment break its silence and shatter the virtuous circle of the "win-win" game. It would only have to provide a definition of the 1992 consensus in words unacceptable to Taiwan, and that would again divide the island's population and political classes, putting Ma Ying-jeou in an awkward position.
In these conditions, despite the opportunities for detente provided by the new political direction in Taiwan, the modus vivendi should be seen as fragile, reversible at any moment, and limited to economic progress in certain areas. With regard to what can be positively achieved, the negotiators from the two sides may be able to finalise agreements on the common struggle against criminal activity or the rules for bilateral trade. But on the other hand, a peace treaty is still a distant goal. The same applies to the complete removal of every political and legal obstacle to the establishment of a true common market between the island and the mainland.[1] "Mutual non-denial" consists precisely in avoiding any wording which openly questions the sovereign nature of the Republic of China in Taiwan, or likewise the One China principle as defined by Beijing.