Asia Centre

In other developments, both Heads of State stated their conviction that Asia is undergoing a historical transformation, and it will be adopting the universal democratic values of freedom and human rights, as well as the market economy and the rule of law. Both men are hoping to encourage this move through the promotion of individual liberties and an improvement in transparency and confidence in political, economic and military spheres, and, finally, through the protection of human dignity and human rights, particularly by resolving outstanding questions over Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korea.

Japan-US cooperation embraces (ikasu) China’s dynamic growth and contributes to the strategic balance in East Asia. The importance of partnerships with regional allies, such as Australia, was also stressed. Both Heads of State called on North Korea to respect its September 2005 commitments[1] and therefore continue its moratorium on missile tests, a plea that turned out to be in vain, as we have known since 4 July.

Japanese concerns about China and North Korea were consequently taken up in this new text, which strives to get the Alliance out of its strictly security dimension, without giving China the feeling that this Alliance is henceforth directed against it (after having previously been directed against the USSR during the Cold War).

This declaration came about amidst speculation to do with a forthcoming launch of a long-range missile by North Korea. Since early May, the Japanese and American governments had been of the view that Korea was preparing for this[2]. On 20 June, the Pentagon announced that it had entered a new phase in the deployment of the anti-missile ground defense system protecting American territory. The following day, Korea let it be known that it might carry out a missile test. On June 23^rd, in application of a government decision of December 24^th 2005, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Asô, signed an agreement with the United States Ambassador, Thomas Schieffer, on the development and production of the new generation SM3 anti-missile missile, which is vital to the anti-missile defense system.

9. an examination of further measures – particularly financial, in application of the laws on exchanges and international trade.

Japan submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council on July 10^th condemning North Korea, adopting sanctions and containing a reference to chapter 7 of the United Nations charter. This draft resolution was rejected by China and Russia, which proposed a new wording. On the 15^th, a compromise text was adopted, which condemned North Korea and enjoined it to suspend its activities; it called on the international community to exercise vigilance to prevent the transfer of materials, goods, technologies or funds to Korea, or the acquisition by Korea of materials, goods, technologies or funds capable of aiding its ballistic and WMD programme. Reference to the urgent nature of the sanctions was dropped, as was the reference to chapter 7, but resolution 1695 condemning Korea was unanimously adopted.

On September 19^th, the Japanese government, like the United States and Australia, adopted a series of financial sanctions aimed at implementing the resolution’s recommendations.

The launch of Korean missiles in July led Mr. Abe, the secretary general of the government, and M. Nukaga, the director of the Defense Agency, to declare that Japan should acquire a military capability that would enable it to strike an enemy base where a missile launch threatening Japan would be imminent. In these discussions, this notion is distinct from that of preventative strikes.

Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution restricts Japan to self-defense. The question of whether this notion (framed by law) may be extended to preventative strikes has been debated, and as early as February 1956, Prime Minister Hatoyama came out in favour of such an extension. For those who subscribe to this interpretation, the Constitution did not intend for the Japanese population to sit idly by waiting for death, in the words of the former director of the Defense Agency, M. Ishiba[4].

The firing of a Taepodong 1 in August 1998 had led Japan to accept that it should carry out a study jointly with the United States on an anti-missile defense system and that it should equip itself with information-gathering satellites (theoretically civilian). The new launches provide the government with the best argument for convincing the population that Japan must give itself the means of confronting the ballistic and nuclear threat.

The government has thus announced that the PAC3s, which were to be deployed from March 2008, would be introduced already in the current fiscal year (before March 2007). For its part, the American government is going to deploy PAC3 missiles around its bases on Okinawa, beginning in August.

A non specific threat

On July 5^th, North Korea launched 7 missiles which all crashed into the Sea of Japan. Five and a half hours later, the secretary general of the government made the following declaration[1]: “we can only be extremely worried by the firing of these missiles” (kiwamete yûryo subeki mono), which are a problem in terms of the proliferation of ADMs, stability and international peace as well as our own security. These launches are also contrary to the moratorium agreed to in the Japan-Korea joint declaration made in Pyongyang (2002).

Already by lunchtime Japan had published a series of measures (Kitachôsen ni yoru dandô misairu no hassha jian ni kakaru wagakuni no tômen no taiô ni tsuite).

The draft resolution presented to the Security Council late morning on the 6^th (Japanese time) proposed:

5. the immediate reconvening of the Six-party talks.

It was furthermore specified that “the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons or their carriers constitutes a threat to peace and international stability” and that ”Korea’s launching of missiles had heightened tensions in East Asia and the surrounding area, and thereby constituted a serious subject of concern”.

The compromise resolution that was finally adopted does not say that North Korea constitutes a threat, although this no doubt did not represent the view of the international community.

Was Japan the target?

How is it that the Japanese government, whilst condemning and sanctioning North Korea, did not say that the missile launch was a threat to Japan?

On July 5^th, North Korea fired off Scuds with a range of 500km, a distance covering the whole of the Korean peninsula; Rodongs with a range of 1300kms covering the whole of Japan; Taepodongs with a range of between 3500 and 6000kms capable or reaching Alaska. This was not only for the purposes of military exercises. These launches could have been the result of a compromise among the Korean authorities – between the army and Kim Jong-Il – for example, or a signal being sent to the United States in order to get bilateral negotiations; a willful act on the part of North Korea overshadowed by Iraq and Iran, and wishing to obtain, like India and Pakistan, the status of a country in possession of nuclear weapons. There has been a good deal of speculation among experts on the aims of these launches, but no one to my knowledge is claiming that North Korea was intending to reach Japan.

Already in May it seemed likely that there would be a Taepodong 2 launch. In June, it was learnt that preparations were underway and that a launch could take place within two to three days. In this way the Japanese government was able to prepare its response[2]. No declaration was made stigmatising the launches as a threat to Japan. The secretary general merely stated that “the launches directly concerned Japan’s security”.

The limit of sanctions adopted by Japan, however strict the Japanese government may have claimed them to be, has shown that if the view of the international community does not back up Japan’s North Korea policy, then Japan simply has no influence.

Does the range of the missiles constitute a threat?

If we posit the threat as T, capability as C, and intentions as I, then T = C x I.

I am not claiming that the missiles do not constitute a threat merely because the Japanese government is not talking about one.

North Korea does have missiles that can reach Japan; apart from the fact that it does not release information that would enable us to have any confidence, its intentions are uncertain. It therefore cannot be affirmed that North Korea does not constitute a threat.

In order for missiles to constitute a threat, they must be destructive. Therefore, what is required is the carrier, the missile, and its charge, the nuclear warhead. It is known that North Korea has missiles; we also know that it has a uranium enrichment programme and that it has acquired six to eight nuclear warheads containing plutonium. Other requirements still need to be met, of course: the tests must be successfully carried out; the country must know how to manufacture bombs and then be able to make them small enough that they can be loaded onto the missiles. For the time being, North Korea cannot make nuclear bombs.