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Extract and translated from the French E-bulletin “Japan Analysis – La Lettre du Japon” n°1, September 2005, pp. 4-5. Sources: Asahi, Yomiuri, and Kyôdô News.
French Editor: G. Delamotte. Translation: Jonathan Hall
The ceremony to mark the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War, held in Tokyo in August, was the occasion for a declaration from the Prime Minister which echoed the one made in 1995 by one of his predecessors, Mr. Murayama. That declaration from a socialist Prime Minister was seen as the first real expression of profound regret on the part of Japan for the atrocities of the militarist period.
Mr. Koizumi's vigorous reaffirmation of his commitment to peace, expressing his "determination that Japan would never again take the road to war", came at a time of underlying tensions following the hostile exchanges in February between Japan and South Korea over the Takeshima Islands, the somewhat icy meeting between Koizumi and Roh on June 20th, and the demonstrations in China in April. He emphasised that Japan " through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations ". Once again he expressed his "feeling of deep remorse and heartfelt apology". He added that all Japanese people, of whom 70% had never experienced war, had received an education preparing them for peace, which was their deepest aspiration, and he concluded that "Japan, as a peace-loving nation, expresses here again that it will work to achieve peace and prosperity of all humankind ".
Prime Minister Murayama's declaration on August 15th 1995
While praising the Japanese success story, the Prime Minister voiced his gratitude to all those countries which had helped it, especially the United States. He then continued:" During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history.
The repetition of these excuses somewhat attenuates their effectiveness, but on this occasion the Prime Minister's deeds matched his words, since he refrained from visiting the Yasukuni shrine on August 15th of that year.[1] In early June several leading figures from the LDP (the President of the lower chamber and eight former Prime Ministers) had called upon the Prime Minister to suspend these visits. The need to build a secular monument to pay respects to fallen combatants is becoming more pressing, in order to lower tensions with South Korea in particular (China is suspected of playing the anti-Japanese card for nationalist purposes). Another suggestion, supported by Hidenao Nakagawa, the LDP President of the parliamentary foreign affairs committee, has been to "remove" the category A war criminals. However, the shrine authorities are strongly opposed to this, asserting that the Japanese people have never accepted the categories of war criminals.
The leading political figures stated their position at the end of June. The president of the Japan War-bereaved Families Association (Izokukai) emphasised that as the association's president he appreciated the Prime Minister's visits, but that it was right to address the concerns of neighbouring countries. The members of the association immediately distanced themselves from their president's declaration. The president of the Kômeitô warned the Prime Minister that any further visits could damage their co-operation. The general secretary of the LDP, Mr. Takebe, and the president of the Democratic Party, Mr. Okada, expressed support for the building of a new shrine.
As for public opinion, a majority of 52% were in favour of halting the visits. Of these, 76% opposed the visits out of consideration for neighbouring countries, only 13% because such visits honoured war criminals, and 6% because they raised the prestige of a military or religious institution. Out of the 36% of the respondents who favoured continuation of the visits, 39% found it questionable to follow the wishes of foreign countries, 36% said that the shrine was an appropriate resting place, 13% favoured the visits because of the Prime Minister's oath to support peace, and 9% because the visits accorded with their own convictions.[2]
French Editor: G. Delamotte. Translation: Jonathan Hall
Are the younger generations of Chinese anti-Japanese? Sonoda Shigeto believes that this sentiment is greatly exaggerated
In an interview with Tanaka Akihito published in Chuô Kôron, Mr. Okamoto Yukio stated his view that anti-Japanese sentiments among Chinese youth had reached a new peak, because of their nationalist education.
However, many studies contradict these views. The 2003 survey on Asian attitudes to Japan, for example, found that in China 29.7% of the population thought that Japan had a good or quite good influence on their country, whereas 39.8% considered that influence to be bad or quite bad, and 30.4% did not reply. So the majority of the replies were indeed negative. But among young people in their 20s, the corresponding figures were 31.7%, 27.2%, and 26.5% respectively.
The Chinese Institute of Sociology's centre for media research conducted a study during the demonstrations in April 2005, which found that the numbers claiming to like or quite like Japan amounted to 28.5% of the total, which was 10 points higher than in the previous study of 2001. The proportion had risen particularly sharply in the younger age group.
What is the reason for this mistaken view about young Chinese people's attitudes to Japan? It probably arises from the Japanese feeling of being under attack. What would they say to Chinese visitors to Japan who might hear the loudspeaker vans of the extreme right bawling out their slogans and conclude that Japan is shifting to the right? If these excesses are now accepted as normal, why aren't the Chinese demonstrations seen in the same light?
The development of a new self-awareness in China
The Japanese loudspeaker vans have been there for a long time whereas the demonstrations in China are new.
For the last ten years China has been in a situation of social vacuum and overturned values. The years of the Cultural Revolution saw the imposition of the ideology of class struggle. In an egalitarian society, where social progress had become the sole source of national pride, such events as the rape of Nanking became politicised. While certain people had anti-Japanese feelings, they were unable to express them. It should be stressed, however, that this situation enabled the 1972 declaration and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations.
With the progress of the reforms, and the development of Southern China in particular, class differences have reappeared, people's perceptions of the progress have changed, and a new ideology has become necessary to maintain social control.
A love-hate relationship: ambivalent feelings towards the resurgent China
Faced with a China which is asserting its presence in the world, the Japanese have divided feelings. These are very similar to their former attitudes towards the United States. Being on the winning side in the Second World War, China had a seat on the Security Council, but Japan paid it no war reparations. While Japan was enjoying a long period of rapid growth, China embarked on the "Great Leap Forward" and the Cultural Revolution. The Japanese felt that they had lost out to the Americans, but not to the Chinese. They had very few guilt feelings, even though psychological barriers had been set up which made it impossible to conceive of repeating acts similar to those perpetrated during the war. The Chinese sense of grievance, however, was enough to lock both countries into a vicious circle.
In addition, in the 1990s when China was undergoing rapid development, Japan entered into "the lost decade". As China gained self-confidence and Japan's self-confidence declined, these two opposing states of mind disturbed the delicate balance in the relations between the two countries.
In this unsettled context, Chinese feelings towards Japan combine hatred and contempt with envy and fear. As long as the problems inherited from history persist, they will draw their force not from the past but from the present.