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French Editor: G. Delamotte. Translation: Peter Brown
On 29 June, Prime Minister Koizumi and President Bush held their final summit before the expiry of Mr. Koizumi’s term of office, and adopted a declaration called The Japan-US Alliance for the New Century. Both leaders welcomed the progress in Japan-US relations and hope that it may be developed further.
They stressed their common values and ideals and anticipate the Alliance being extended to cover certain international economic issues.
New areas of cooperation were defined as follows:
- promoting growth and economic reforms; - promoting the opening up of markets; - taking action in favour of the free circulation of goods, services, people and capital at the same time as maintaining the anti-terrorism struggle; - implementing and tightening intellectual property rights; - improving world energy security;
- maintaining a favourable climate for business in both countries.
In other developments, both Heads of State stated their conviction that Asia is undergoing a historical transformation, and it will be adopting the universal democratic values of freedom and human rights, as well as the market economy and the rule of law. Both men are hoping to encourage this move through the promotion of individual liberties and an improvement in transparency and confidence in political, economic and military spheres, and, finally, through the protection of human dignity and human rights, particularly by resolving outstanding questions over Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korea.
Japan-US cooperation embraces (ikasu) China’s dynamic growth and contributes to the strategic balance in East Asia. The importance of partnerships with regional allies, such as Australia, was also stressed. Both Heads of State called on North Korea to respect its September 2005 commitments[1] and therefore continue its moratorium on missile tests, a plea that turned out to be in vain, as we have known since 4 July.
Japanese concerns about China and North Korea were consequently taken up in this new text, which strives to get the Alliance out of its strictly security dimension, without giving China the feeling that this Alliance is henceforth directed against it (after having previously been directed against the USSR during the Cold War).
This declaration came about amidst speculation to do with a forthcoming launch of a long-range missile by North Korea. Since early May, the Japanese and American governments had been of the view that Korea was preparing for this[2]. On 20 June, the Pentagon announced that it had entered a new phase in the deployment of the anti-missile ground defense system protecting American territory. The following day, Korea let it be known that it might carry out a missile test. On June 23rd, in application of a government decision of December 24th 2005, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Asô, signed an agreement with the United States Ambassador, Thomas Schieffer, on the development and production of the new generation SM3 anti-missile missile, which is vital to the anti-missile defense system.
On July 5th [3], Korea launched seven missiles, including a long-range Taepodong 2 which crashed not far from its launch-pad. Even before the launch of the seventh missile, the Japanese government had announced a series of sanctions and demands, some of which were principally of symbolic value:1. the abandonment of the ballistic programme, the cessation of exports, the unconditional return to the Six-party talks;2. a ban from Japanese ports of the ferry Mangyonbongô which carries passengers and goods;3. a ban from Japanese territory of representatives of the Korean authorities;4. a ban on leaving the country for representatives of the Korean authorities resident in Japan;5. the postponement of trips to North Korea by Japanese officials and a recommendation that the general public refrain from travelling there;6. a ban on charter flights between Korea and Japan;7. a tightening of the policing of exports bound for Korea which contain material that could be used in a ballistic or nuclear programme; 8. the strict application of existing legal provisions;
9. an examination of further measures – particularly financial, in application of the laws on exchanges and international trade.
Japan submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council on July 10th condemning North Korea, adopting sanctions and containing a reference to chapter 7 of the United Nations charter. This draft resolution was rejected by China and Russia, which proposed a new wording. On the 15th, a compromise text was adopted, which condemned North Korea and enjoined it to suspend its activities; it called on the international community to exercise vigilance to prevent the transfer of materials, goods, technologies or funds to Korea, or the acquisition by Korea of materials, goods, technologies or funds capable of aiding its ballistic and WMD programme. Reference to the urgent nature of the sanctions was dropped, as was the reference to chapter 7, but resolution 1695 condemning Korea was unanimously adopted.
On September 19th, the Japanese government, like the United States and Australia, adopted a series of financial sanctions aimed at implementing the resolution’s recommendations.
The launch of Korean missiles in July led Mr. Abe, the secretary general of the government, and M. Nukaga, the director of the Defense Agency, to declare that Japan should acquire a military capability that would enable it to strike an enemy base where a missile launch threatening Japan would be imminent. In these discussions, this notion is distinct from that of preventative strikes.
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution restricts Japan to self-defense. The question of whether this notion (framed by law) may be extended to preventative strikes has been debated, and as early as February 1956, Prime Minister Hatoyama came out in favour of such an extension. For those who subscribe to this interpretation, the Constitution did not intend for the Japanese population to sit idly by waiting for death, in the words of the former director of the Defense Agency, M. Ishiba[4].
The firing of a Taepodong 1 in August 1998 had led Japan to accept that it should carry out a study jointly with the United States on an anti-missile defense system and that it should equip itself with information-gathering satellites (theoretically civilian). The new launches provide the government with the best argument for convincing the population that Japan must give itself the means of confronting the ballistic and nuclear threat.
The government has thus announced that the PAC3s, which were to be deployed from March 2008, would be introduced already in the current fiscal year (before March 2007). For its part, the American government is going to deploy PAC3 missiles around its bases on Okinawa, beginning in August.