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Extract and translated from the French E-bulletin China Analysis – Les Nouvelles de Chine n°9, Oct. 2006, pp. 2-4
French Editor: M.Meidan. Translation: Michael Black
Summary and comments by Mathieu Duchâtel based on:
– Luo Bing, "Agitation in Taiwan shocks mainland China" Zhengming, n° 348, October 2006, pp. 9-10
In Taiwan, the movement demanding the resignation of President Chen Shui-bian was in the forefront of the media and political scene all through September[1]. While one could imagine that the communist leaders would have observed with delight the popular condemnation of a statesman they abhor, Chinese reaction was in reality more qualified. This article from Zhengming sheds interesting light on the decision-making mechanisms in China where the question of Taiwan is concerned. Above all, it confirms Chinese fears of contagion of the People's Republic from Taiwan, in the form of an extension of the fight against corruption and of the demonstrations calling for the resignation of political leaders[2].
On September 5 2006, the Central Committee's Political Bureau announced the creation of an "observation group of the Taiwanese situation" (中央台灣局勢觀察組), answerable directly to the Political Bureau. The mission of this temporary structure is to analyse in detail the evolution of domestic unrest in Taiwan in order to adjust China's Taiwan policy accordingly, but also to conserve the "initiative" (主動性) in cross-Strait relations. Among the group, which is directed by Zeng Qinghong[3], are three members of the Political Bureau: Wang Zhaoguo (vice-president of the permanent committee of the People's Congress), Zhang Dejiang (the Party's general secretary in the province of Canton), and Cao Gangchuan (vice-president of the military affairs committee and Minister of Defence). Also present are two senior military leaders of the PLA: its chief of staff, Liang Guanglie, and Zhang Hetian (a member of the command in the military region of Fujian). Tang Jiaxuan, Chen Yunlin (director of the bureau of Taiwanese Affairs of the Council of State and of the Central Committee) and Wang Gang[4] (director of the Secretariat of the Central Committee) make up the rest of this ad hoc structure. In Shanghai, Fuzhou and Shenzhen, the Political Bureau has announced the creation of three regional groups to monitor the Taiwanese situation.
During September, the observation group was the source of five directives, issued by the the Council of State, the Central Committee of the Party, the Department of Propaganda and the Ministry of Public Security, concerning preventive measures in order to prepare for the evolution of the situation in Taiwan and its possible repercussions on social order in China.
Events in Taiwan have been the origin of a heightening of the level of alert of the apparatus responsible for relations with Taiwan, but also of all the structures responsible for mainland China's domestic security.
On September 5, the Council of State published an initial directive sent to the provincial organisations of the Party, as well as the propaganda and public security structures of the State. This directive requested its recipients to increase their level of vigilance and understanding of the political situation on the island, but also to protect at any price the security and "rights" of Taiwanese residents and travellers in China. It forbade them to make comments on the situation in Taiwan which might be interpreted as an evolution in the central government's line towards Taiwan. Finally, on the influence the situation in Taiwan could have on the Chinese provinces, the document calls for preparation, vigilance and swift action against any "budding" of unrest inspired by the anticorruption movement on the island.
The next day, the Department of Propaganda sent an urgent directive to the units responsible for propaganda, the publishing houses, and the various media, as well as to the academies of social science and research structures of the various provinces. The directive enjoins them to cover unrest in Taiwan within the framework of the rules applied to information about Taiwan and to send all documents concerning the latter to the provincial bureau of propaganda for examination, while announcing that after publication or broadcast, their authors would be responsible for the content of their texts. It also forbids them to make political comments on events in Taiwan, in order not to produce any counter-productive effects. Lastly it emphasises the extreme prudence to be practised in relation to any information on the events in Taiwan if these become "violent" and recalls the essential role of the bureau of propaganda in the selection of news and pictures. In the provinces of Canton, Hunan, Jiangxi and Jiangsu, the propaganda authorities have had to deal ruthlessly with the publication of news which went beyond the framework established by the Chinese authorities.
On September 8, it was the Department of Public Security's turn to issue "three warnings". The first emphasises the necessity of avoiding any anti-corruption social movement which takes as its model that of the "anti-corruption [movement] against Shen Shui-bian" (反貪倒扁). It specifies the risk of government or CCP buildings being "surrounded"[5]. The second and third warnings are aimed at "foreign hostile forces" whether resident inside or outside China, and call for vigilance against any attempt to use propaganda to divide the Chinese by instrumentalising events in Taiwan.
On September 18 the general offices of the Central Committee of the Council of State issued a directive relating to "security work during the holiday period" of the national holiday. It was adressed to the high provincial officials of the People's Armed Police, of Public Security and of the military authorities. It expressly requests them to double vigilance on the eve of the national holiday and of the 6th plenary session of the 16th Central Committee, because "forces hostile" to China could use the pretext of unrest in Taiwan to increase the intensity of their activities. On September 20, the Council of State and the central committee for military affairs simply cancelled the leave of all top-ranking leaders of the People's Armed Police and of Public Security, instructing them to increase the level of alert (執勤等級).
During a meeting of the observation group, Zeng Qinghong summarised Chinese preoccupations in the face of the anti-Chen Shui-bian movement in Taiwan, without stipulating the responses envisaged by Beijing in case of developments deemed to be unacceptable to the communist authorities. These can be summed up as taking five main directions:
- Monitoring the situation carefully if it evolves towards major social unrest and towards a loss of control on the part of the Taiwanese authorities.
- Increasing attention to the reactions of Chen Shui-bian, in particular in case he seeks to create a diversion by accelerating his independence agenda, for example by using the pretext of constitutional reform (which he has since done, without any major consequences).
- Observing American response, as well as its "degree of implication" (介入程度) in events on the island.
- Observing the evolution of the degree of linkage between the Japanese government and supporters of independence in Taiwan, and Tokyo's involvement.
- Maintaining vigilance as to the possible consequences of the Taiwanese situation on sociopolitical equilibrium on the mainland.
Finally, during the meeting, Zeng Qinghong judged that the State and Party authorities should learn from and ponder the causes of the anti-Chen Shui-bian movement in Taiwan. While the Communist Party has often sought to imitate certain policies which lay at the origin of the Taiwanese economic miracle — while blackening Taiwan's democratic experience — it has to guard against the collateral damage which could be produced in China by better knowledge of another aspect of life on the island: freedom of expression and freedom to demonstrate against one's leaders and to publicly denounce corruption.