Asia Centre

These two articles were published after the North Korean ballistic missile tests on July 4, but before the nuclear test on October 9, in the journal of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), the most important Chinese international relations institute. Written by the president of the CICIR, on the one hand, and by the director of its strategic research centre on the other, they are more complementary than really divergent[1]. And yet, despite a number of points in common, the emphasis differs occasionally between one article and the other. Mr. Cui notes that on the subject of relations between China and North Korea, which are influenced by both historical factors and realistic considerations, there is a range of opinion among Chinese experts: however, "the dominant trend among [Chinese] leaders considers that traditional Chinese-Korean relations must be preserved in order to safeguard peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula".

Mr. Cui Liru puts forward the trend in Chinese foreign policy which leads China to play the role of a strategic pendulum in relation to the weakening of North Korea since the fall of the USSR. It was this development which led China to go beyond a strict policy of non-intervention to which it had adhered since the end of the Korean War. Militarily, that confrontation was between the United States and North Korea; strategically, it was between the United States and the Soviet Union. With the fall of the latter, as well as the political changes in South Korea, it was the confrontation between North Korea and the United States which became the main characteristic of the geopolitical situation in the region. China then had to get involved, in order to "avoid the worst", which is to say military conflict, and to prepare positive change on the peninsula. China has since played the role of a "strategic pendulum" (战略平衡角色, zhanlue pingheng juese), a role which South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun has also taken on, as Mr. Cui mentions.

He notes that, beyond being brothers in arms in the Korean War, political and security needs have become different in the two countries because of the widening economic gap between them. But it is important to understand that North Korea's attitude "is absolutely not irrational"; it can be deduced from the "Cold War" system which persists on the peninsula and in which North Korea finds itself in an unfavourable position, which leads to a "singular logic of behaviour". The economic ruin and the collapse of the North are a danger to its neighbours and to the region as a whole, even as it benefits from the strategic rebalancing brought about by relations between China and North Korea. North Korea's sensitivity about questions of sovereignty also imposes a prudent attitude on China: Chinese influence, inherited from traditional links, is limited, even though it is mythified by a number of foreign analysts.

It is true that South Korea has developed strong links with China, of which Mr. Cui makes a detailed and optimistic assessment, including human contacts (2 million visitors in 2003, 180,000 long-term South Korean residents in China in 2005, including 35,000 students). This is the result of Roh Moo-hyun's "independence policy", although China "does not harbour the illusion that South Korea would place [their] relations above those with the United States". The latter maintain twofold relations with China, a combination of cooperation as well as competition and conflict: this is true where North Korea  is concerned, and particularly in the six-party talks where the Americans asked North Korea  to "atone for the original sin" of nuclear power (赦免的原罪, shimian de yuanzui), without recognising its sovereignty or its legitimate concerns.

While wishing to be an "honest broker" (an American term which has entered the Chinese language), China has different objectives from the United States: it wants peace and stability on the peninsula, while  America's priority, in line with the "Big Stick" tradition, goes to denuclearisation.

Mr. Lin Limin of course takes up a number of these points, with occasional nuances in their expression or in their order of importance. Emphasising historical factors — Japanese milirarism, the crossing of the 38^th parallel by the United States in 1950, despite Chinese warnings — he considerably downplays their contemporary strategic impact: Japan and the United States are no longer in the same hostile relationship with China, and the Chinese nuclear arsenal dissuades and makes impossible any military adventure aimed at northeast China; Korea "is no longer a front door to China" on a strategic level. It is historical memories and subjective feelings which persist, "in particular in the Chinese army".

One must therefore look for realistic reasons to explain China's new involvement, since 2002, in the management of the Korean nuclear crisis. This follows the policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping, who recommended peaceful coexistence, non-interference and lack of criticism. China must first of all protect North Korea for reasons of prestige and national honour, as the collapse of North Korea would be considered a political setback for China.

Next, although it has been falling since 1991, Chinese trade with North Korea seems to be stabilising at between 1 and 2 billion dollars per year. While this is modest, it nevertheless brings "stability and prosperity" to Northeast    China. Moreover, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea has ore and precious metals[2] ; Chinese investment (100 million dollars in 35 projects up to 2003) seems therefore likely to increase.

Stategically, on the other hand,  the nuclearisation of North Korea risks bringing about, in a chain reaction, that of Japan and of Taiwan, as well the destabilisation of Northeast Asia, which is the mainspring of the peaceful growth of China's economy. A crisis would thus lead to the flow of millions of North Korean refugees into China, threatening the prosperity of the provinces of the Northeast. Although it is allied to North Korea, China also shares certain interests in Northeast Asia with the United States: the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, through a multilateral process, as well as Sino-Japanese relations and the impact of a crisis on the situation in the Taiwan Strait. Finally, Mr. Lin does not erect a monument to six-party talks, but recalls the precedents of the four-party talks in 1997-1999[3] and the tripartite talks in the Spring of 2003[4]. The latter meeting saved the face of the two protagonists, with the North Koreans being able to believe that China's role was limited to that of host, and the United States being able to see it as a multilateral meeting.

In fact, Mr. Lin balances without really choosing between a more directly involved China, evidently inspired by concerns which have little to do with the past, and a reminder of the five principles of peaceful coexistence and non-intervention.