Asia Centre

The second half of 2006 marked an important turning-point in Sino-Japanese relations: Shinzo Abe's decision to make his first official visit since his appointment as Prime Minister to China (rather than to the United States), and the North Korean nuclear test, contributed to a warming of relations between the two Asian giants.

The leaders of the two countries were also able to meet at the APEC summit, thus putting an end to five years of political coldness in an economically heated context.

These two articles reflect both the viewpoint of the official press and that of a researcher from the prestigious research centre for international relations, who is now part of the Chinese government, and highlight the consensual nature of Sino-Japanese relations: in content, the analyses diverge little, particularly in the distance they keep from the subject in question. Sino-Japanese relations are not presented as being as fundamental for China as they may be for Japan or for Asia. The "readjustment" (调整) of Japan's China policy is indeed remarkable and is to be favourably received, but it is up to Abe to maintain the momentum. Just beneath the surface of these texts lies the idea that the continuation of warmer relations depends only on the decisions of the Japanese government, and that this warming is an implicit signal of Japan's return to the Asian community after the distance maintained by Koizumi.

The initiative for this change in political line is entirely attributed to Abe (in relation to overtures said to have been made on the Chinese side) principally for domestic political reasons. The overture towards China is said to have been used by Abe to set himself apart fom Koizumi and to score points on the domestic front, before having to take action on more highly-charged matters. The undeniable success of his foreign policy is said to make it possible for Abe to stabilise his political situation, at least in the short term.

While the authors present the "proactive" attitude adopted by Abe towards China as positive, necessary and important (especially to Japan's national interests), they also refer, in passing, to its pragmatic and even opportunistic side.  A certain ambiguity emerges from their analyses: on the one hand they assert that Abe's readjustment of Japanese policy is a change of form more than of content, but on the other they elaborate on the positive consequences of joint Sino-Japanese action on a regional level, taking the improvement in relations as a fait accompli. While criticising Shinzo Abe's conservative and nationalist tendencies, the possibility that the visits to Yakusuni might begin again and the desire to contain China, they are already announcing a new future for East Asia.

The opportunities are indeed many and important: consolidating an economic partnership which in 2006 saw bilateral trade reach 200 billion dollars and Japanese investment in China reach 5.7 billion dollars (by October 2006), and broadening it to include science and technology, energy and environmental protection; providing joint leadership to the Asian community and reinforcing strategic, military and economic cooperation in East Asia. Moreover China offers undeniable economic perspectives to Japan, and is already the engine of an economic growth which has been sustained for fifty-eight months (which is longer than its fifty-seven month period of growth in the 1960s, as Wang notes).

The authors note that the vicious circle of mutual distrust has now been broken, and could open the way to more extensive cooperation on the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and the economic and political integration of Asia. This integration could then further consolidate the Sino-Japanese partnership. The (real or imaginary) rivalry for the domination of Asia thus seems to be brushed aside by the authors. Once the "political obstacles" (which is to say the visits to Yasukuni Temple and the question of history) have been set aside, bilateral relations can only improve. Moreover 2007 marks the 35^th anniversary of the normalisation of diplomatic relations, and can thus only be promising on the bilateral level.

However the authors also put forward a few reservations, as certain factors could still alter the situation, and political tensions which can not be so quickly erased may reappear:

1.       The emergence of China and "the assertion of its development model" run the risk of arousing apprehension in Japan and giving rise to an increase in nationalism, a tendency which the conservative Shinzo Abe could encourage. The pursuit of the "normalisation" of Japan and the project for creating an American-style National Security Council^[1] could only exacerbate tensions between the two giants.

2.       Japan still promotes an ideology and values aimed at limiting China's political influence. Declarations about an Asian community based on the spread of freedom, of democracy and the rule of law, as well as the inclusion of New Zealand and Australia are no more than ways of asserting Japan's leadership role and of helping to encircle (围堵) China. Likewise, efforts aimed at setting up an economic partnership agreement "merely counter efforts towards a free trade zone between China and the ASEAN countries". As Asian integration progresses, the "Japanisation" of Asia and the "imposition of the Japanese model" will become increasingly sensitive questions.

3.       The question of transparency and of modernisation in the military field: Wang sees the military question as producing a twofold problem: firstly Japanese aspirations in the field, exacerbated by the Korean nuclear test which gave rise to debate about the nuclearisation of the country, and secondly references made in Japanese defence White Papers to the lack of transparency in the Chinese military, serve only to stimulate an arms race.

4.       Moreover the question of Yasukuni temple has not been settled. In the short term, it seems the question has been resolved, but in the long term, in the context of reviving nationalist sentiment in Japan, the visits to the Yasukuni temple could again become a source of disagreement. Abe has only made "vague statements" (表态模糊) on the subject and could well, as he stated before he was elected, go there himself. Moreover, reform of the basic law on education is said to aim at reinforcing patriotic and nationalist themes in school texts, and at minimising the lessons of history^[2]. 

While the tone used by Wang remains relatively moderate, referring to problems to be managed constructively by both sides, the Huanqiu Shibao is more demanding where the Japanese leaders are concerned, making any improvement in relations conditional on the continuation of the search for and destruction of all traces of Japanese chemical weapons in China, in accordance with the decision taken in 1997 during the UN's Convention on the banning of chemical weapons.

Lastly the question of Taiwan does not fail to appear: although Wang does not refer to it, it is brought up by the Huanqiu Shibao rather as a reminder to Japan of what China considers to be the rules of the game: "Japan should assert its support for the One China policy, not have official relations with the island and not support Taiwanese independence".