Asia Centre

In this research article, Yu Hsiao-yun offers an in-depth analysis of the structure of relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang. It aims to show how the two political parties have sought to reestablish official contacts in a climate of mutual hostility at government level, and to build new kinds of relations and interactions. The author offers a study of the relations between the two parties and seeks to determine the possible directions these recent political developments could take. As he sees it, the future of these relations remains subject to the problem of the institutionalisation of the decisions taken by the two political parties, and only a Kuomintang victory in the 2008 presidential election could make possible the perpetuation of this novel relationship.

On April 26 2005, the President of the Kuomintang and the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party decided to establish a "Forum between the two political parties of the two shores" (dang dui dang de liang an zheng dang gao feng hui). The two parties agreed on the necessity of "peaceful development of the two shores and [on] a common vision" (liang an heping fa zhan gongtong yuanjing) and officially agreed to recognise the existence of the 1992 consensus and to fight against Taiwanese independence (fan taidu). It was the first time since 1945 that such a meeting had taken place between the two hostile parties. On April 13 2006, in accordance with what had emerged during the meeting between Hu Jintao and Lien Chan (lien-hu huitang gongshi) the two parties organised an "Economic Forum of the two shores" (liang an jingji lun tan) whose participants included four vice-presidents of the Kuomintang and 50 of Taiwan's most influential big business leaders. At the end of this economic forum, fifteen measures were announced in the fields of agriculture, medecine and education, the principal aim of whose content was to give Taiwanese products privileged access to the Chinese market and to win the support of Taiwanese public opinion. On October 17 of the same year, the two parties organised a "Forum on agricultural cooperation between the two shores" (liang an nong ye hezuo luntan). The Communist Party announced the broadening and deepening of agricultural measures for Taiwan, with ten principal measures whose objective was to offer financial support and guarantees on the protection of Taiwanese brands and production techniques, and the rights and interests of Taiwanese farmers. On another level, the Foundation for trade between the two shores (Haixia liang an faxue jiaoliu zujinghui) and the Chinese Foundation for legal studies (zhongguo fa xue jiaoliu qijinghui) jointly organised a "Forum for legal studies between the two shores of the Strait" (haixia liangan faxue luntan) in order to consider the problems linked to the financial and trade environment between the two shores as well as questions relating to the protection of investment. In December 2006, the two parties established a "Youth Forum between the two shores" (liangan qingnian luntan) with the objective of increasing exchanges and cooperation among the young in the economic sphere, in scientific development and in the creation of shared structures.

The author then describes the environment in which relations between the two political parties began, emphasising the the contrast between the robustness of economic and trade relations and the coldness of political relations. On the historical level, the Kuomintang, under the presidency of Lee Tenghui, had developed secret high level exchanges with China in the 1990s while the two unofficial associations, the SEF (Strait Exchange Foundation) and the ARATS (Association for Relations Across the Taïwan Strait), had served as institutional frameworks. The two associations had thus carried out relatively transparent exchanges by means of semi-government agents. Most of the exchanges were of a governmental kind and therefore limited. President Lee Tenghui's visit to Cornell University in the United States in 1995 and the first election by direct universal suffrage of the Taiwanese President in 1996 provoked the missile crisis and the two associations definitively and totally ceased their exchanges. In 2000, after the democratic changeover of political power at the top of the Taiwanese state and under the government of the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), Chinese and Taiwanese policies between the two shores maintained a prudent conservatism on the level both of governmental interaction and exchanges through secret channels. But at the same time, on the economic, commercial, cultural and human levels, exchanges between the two shores experienced unprecedented growth^[1].

The author then notes the space left open to the Kuomintang by the conservatism and the passivity of President Chen Shui-bian's policy towards the mainland. According to the author, Chen limited himself to respecting his commitment to the five negatives and continued to refuse to recognise the 1992 consensus and the One China principle. On the level of economic policy between the the two shores, the principles of "active opening and efficient management" having mutated into "efficient opening and active management" brought the development of trade to a deadlock^[2]. This is where the author considers that the political space left to the Kuomintang represented a deciding factor in the construction of a new relationship with the Chinese Communist Party. Thus, as he sees it, it was the Kuomintang's experience and competence in the economic management of relations between the two shores which made it possible for the party to seize the issue. According to the minutes of the meetings of the Central Committee which the author quotes, on May 17 2000, Lien Chan had suggested, under the auspices of the "Guidelines for national unification", building "brotherly relations of peaceful competition" (heping bicai xiongdi guanxi), broadening exchanges and increasing agreements in the hope of building cooperation based on mutual trust (yijiu huxin hezuo) in order to create mutual respect in the framework of a mutually beneficial relationship (huzhong shuangying). Among Lien Chan's proposals, that  of building inter-party communication between the two shores (liangan zhengdang jiuliu goudong) sought to show the space for development of these relations between the two shores which the Kuomintang could take on and manage. Things were decided in 2001, when the vice-president of the Kuomintang Wu Po-hsiung met the Chinese vice-president Qian Qichen on the mainland. This was an informal meeting which, according to the author, made possible the beginning of relations between the two political parties. Despite the promulgation of the anti-secession law on March 3 2005 and the atmosphere of crisis thus produced, on March 28, vice-president Chiang Pin-kun led a Kuomintang delegation to China and met the director of the bureau of Taiwanese Affairs Chen Yunlin, thus making possible the beginning of official relations between the two political parties. In April 2005, Lien Chan began his journey for peace (heping zhi lu) and the economic Forum between the two shores (liangan jingmao lutan) was launched in October 2006. Sixty years on, the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang returned to the establishment of official channels of communication on an unprecedented scale, putting an end to hostile relations.

On a political level, the Kuomintang was ready to face this renewal with political arguments and concrete proposals. The Kuomintang defined relations between the two shores in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of China, a constitutional China (xianfa yi zhong). The party's mainland policy was organised in accordance with the guidelines for national unification and under the principle of "One China, different interpretations". Opposition to Taiwanese independence, and reunification in the long term (pu ji tong), were defined as the guiding principles of relations between the two shores, which were moreover described as two separate but equal political entities (duideng fenzhi zhuantai). It was a question of avoiding war, of actively promoting peace, and of creating, on the level of trade, a stable and mutually beneficial interaction. On the wider level of economic policy, the Kuomintang suggested a policy aimed, on the one hand, at attracting an ever-increasing number of foreign companies and investors to Taiwan and allowing the integration of foreign companies with a strategy of penetrating the Chinese market, and on the other hand, at a large scale negotiation with China concerning the sharing out of production tasks and economic and trade cooperation. According to the author, the Kuomintang's ambition was to build with China a form of normalisation of relations and a platform for systematic communication (zhiduxing de goutong pintai), and to make possible the creation between the two parties of an elite forum (liangan minjian qinying luntan) and a system of support for Taiwanese entrepreneurs (taishangfuyu jizhi)

On the level of the party's strategy, the author examines how the Kuomintang cleared the political ground necessary for the construction of this new relationship. In the face of the PDP government's refusal to recognise the One China principle and the 1992 consensus, and because of the limitations imposed by its status as an opposition party, the Kuomintang decided to organise its argumentation around the idea of national prosperity (mingsheng), with the objective of building coherence into its approach to exchanges with the other shore. This approach also corresponded with the atmosphere which has characterised relations between the two shores since the PDP came to power: considerably cooler official relations and flourishing human relations (guanfang leng, renmin re). The Kuomintang's approach has had concrete effects in the desire to open Taiwan to tourism, to normalise air links and to solve the problem of equivalences between educational qualifications. On the political level the Kuomintang was planning to organise a second Peace Forum before the 2008 presidential election, in order to discuss political questions, military affairs and national defence. Lastly, on the cultural level, the Kuomintang had the intention of creating a dynamic of powerful cultural exchanges. On the Parliamentary level, the Kuomintang's strategy was to build a solid alliance with People's Party —whose positions on relations between the two shores are similar— with the objective of establishing a majority which would make it possible in particular to revise the texts governing exchanges between the two countries (liangan renim gangxi jiaoli). According to the author, this strategy aimed, in the perspective of the 2008 presidential election, to prove to the Taiwanese electorate that the Kuomintang, unlike the PDP, has the competence and the experience necessary to manage relations between the two shores. The Kuomintang was trying to put across the following message: "The PDP is incapable of managing relations between the two shores and above all does not want to take measures which are beneficial to Taiwan. Thereore it's up to the Kuomintang to do it". Whether or not the PDP agreed with these proposals was not the Kuomintang's principal preoccupation; because of the ideological character of the PDP's approach. The Kuomintang therefore positioned itself from the point of view of the economic interests of the Taiwanese as a whole. This approach, according to the author, has made possible a political opening in relations between the two shores and may condemn the PDP to supporting the status quo for some time. The author concludes by emphasising the fact that the Kuomintang has exchanged its old position in favour of reunification for a position in favour of peace, and remains convinced that not stepping over the Chinese red line of independence will make it possible to assure the development and economic integration of the two shores. He then examines the Kuomintang's optimism on the question of the international space of Taiwan and on confidence-building measures on the military level.

The author then briefly deals with the points of political convergence between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang. As he sees it, the fourth generation of Chinese leaders has renewed Chinese reunification strategy, by basing themselves on China's economic emergence and on Taiwan's increasing interest in the Chinese market, thus creating a number of new cards in its confrontation with Taipei. Chinese tactics have become more sophisticated, and their application more flexible. In September 2004, during the 16^th Communist Party congress, Hu Jintao took control and completely reformulated Beijing's Taiwan policy. It abandoned a posture of negotiation in favour mild attacks (rouxing gongshi). In 2005, apart from the passing of the anti-secession law and the strong pressure maintained on the Taiwanese independence movement, Beijing used a new strategy of "cold management" (leng zhuli), relied on Washington to keep up strong pressure on the Taiwanese on the one hand, and sought to profit from the divisions in Taiwanese society to pursue an attack on all fronts (quanmian shu gong) on the other. These two facets were accompanied by a desire to set aside the conflict over sovereignty and to woo Taiwanese public opinion. In these circumstances the points of agreement between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party increased and made it possible to arrive at a consensus: a common struggle against the Taiwanese independence movement under the aegis of the 1992 consensus. The experience and the competencies of the Kuomintang and its status as the opposition party also made it the obvious partner with whom to build a platform for political dialogue. At the same time, the fact that the slogan "one country, two systems" appears to have been abandoned is an illustration of Beijing's desire to help the Kuomintang return to power in 2008. The two political parties have thus become partners and together can influence the outcome of the 2008 presidential election. In this sense, they have already created a new status quo in the Strait, cooperating in order to maintain stability and wielding influence over the political climate. In the framewok of this new balance which is characterised by cooperation accompanied by competition and by ever stronger US involvement, the three parties can reduce the influence of foreign elements on the resolution of the conflict and, for the first time, the people on both shores can take decisions about the rhythm which should be applied to developments between the two shores of the Strait, and manage the business which concerns them themselves.

The author then asks the question of the effectiveness of this new structure for interaction.  As he sees it, China holds a position with a number of advantages and considerable capacity to inflict damage while only the Taiwanese people and Parliament can exercise a certain kind of influence over the evolution of relations between the two shores. The author considers that in such conditions the PDP government is condemned to passivity. As he sees it, China, by working with the Kuomintang within the framework of the interparty economic Forum, has succeeded in generating support among the Taiwanese on the questions of opening up the island, of Chinese tourism and of the normalisation of air links. In order to face the danger of Taiwan being marginalised and and sucked into the Chinese sphere of influence, it is imperative that the PDP develop a new policy and find a way to influence the new status quo. The control and restriction measures put in place by the government during 2006 showed how it sought to avoid being subjected to the influence of the common approach of the political parties, thus highlighting the latter's the influence and effectiveness.

The author concludes by emphasising the dangers which threaten the permanence of relations between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. As he sees it, the Chinese reunification strategy which aims to hand out economic benefits to Taiwan by relying on a common prosperity could be limited if it does not produce very concrete results for Taiwanese entrepreneurs. The second danger which threatens the collaboration between the two political parties is linked to the Kuomintang's status as the opposition party. According to the author, only a Kuomintang victory in the 2008 presidential elcetion can make it possible to maintain the advantages of inter-party cooperation. He notes the lack of concrete results in the dossiers on the normalisation of direct air links and raises the question of the institutionalisation of the measures adopted by both political parties. Taking as examples the relations developed between the political parties in the two Germanies or in the two Koreas, the author emphasises the impossibility for the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party to make their their cooperation evolve towards institutionalisation if the Kuomintang is defeated in the 2008 presidential election, especially because of the chronic lack of confidence shown towards the PDP by Beijing.