Asia Centre

Russia and the West

The lack of sympathy which Russia is "again" experiencing from the countries of the West is presented as a struggle between the media on the two sides of the divide. The article's essential preoccupation with this aspect is emphasised by its terminology ("illusion", "image", and even a reference to "the Western subconscious"). The appearance of this idea of a Russian menace is as precisely dated ("since 2006") as it is imprecisely characterised (it takes "numerous and different forms"). Moreover, it would seem that for these three writers, its imaginary character spares them the need to draw up a complete list, so its mutating incarnations are just scattered throughout the article. To be brief, these Western "assumptions"[1] represent the Russians as "agents of the Kremlin", "upstart bandits", and "racists and xenophobes" living under "a tyrant's yoke" who stifles human rights. Subject to the temptations of fascism, and backed up by their oil weapon and their military might, they are capable of exercising "a potentially despotic influence in the field of European politics". In short, Russia is a corrupt totalitarian State, shot through with ferocious imperialist ambitions.

The reappearance of these standard Cold War figures is dated explicitly from last year, after the fading of the illusions arising from the fall of the Berlin wall when Westerners "imagined that Russia, by rejoining the democratic States, would cease to threaten them"[2]. It is therefore "the economic take-off" which, "by transforming Russia overnight from being the sick man of Europe to being its strong man", has brought about a revival of the theory of the Russian threat in a Europe which likes nothing better than a weak Russia kept in its place.

But the three writers then depart from this logic of mirroring, which constrains the Russian media to oppose the negative image marketed by the West point by point, and here their rhetoric takes a remarkable turn.[3] They argue that this image, however "unacceptable"  it may be, provides a helpful mirror to the politicians who, by means of "overt diplomatic reactions" to it, may be able to rectify it. In their view, that is what the Russian government does, by "giving the lie" to these distortions, by "showing themselves capable of improving their international image", by using such "non-coercive weapons" as the "common history and culture" which it shares with its neighbours, in order to regain its lost influence. For example, the Russian President himself has no hesitation in entering the fray by responding to questions from the Western press, or in publishing a signed article in the Financial Times. Reading the words of these three journalists soon makes you wonder which takes precedence over the other in their minds, diplomacy or image presentation.

What about China?

Naturally, the question of the conclusions to be drawn by China is quietly addressed throughout the article, owing to the parallelism between its title and the "China Threat Theory". Indeed the three writers are not content with providing a simple account of Western mistrust. After all, China would have good grounds for welcoming a distraction of attention towards Russia, which would favour its own peaceful development.

The studied prudence which the writers show in choosing examples which are not applicable to China (such as the oil weapon, or the Litvinenko affair) is therefore not quite sufficient to dispel the reader's temptation to make the comparison. Because of some of the issues which they associate with the " Russian Threat Theory" (such as the human rights' issue, or relations with rogue states), it comes quite close to that of the "China Threat". It is likewise difficult to resist making the comparison between the two when one reads that Russia, "if it wishes to use the rebirth of its power to the best ends, must properly manage the strategic difficulties facing it".

Seen in this light, the insistence on Russia's active response to Western media attacks, whether the facts were "properly established or not", cannot fail to call to mind such examples as the unpleasant aftertaste left by the official Chinese communiqués referring to the anti-satellite rocket test on January 11th this year.[4] Finally, the sense that there is a link between the stigmatisation of the West and their own "prejudices" (to use their own term) in favour of Russia, is supported by some of their own supplementary remarks:

-   The Europeans appear to them motivated by evil intentions insofar as they have apprehensions about the Russian president, and "set traps"[5] for him.

-   Picking up on the language used by another anonymous source, the writers explain that "Russian émigré lobbies" play a "controlling role" in the Western media, lumping the USSR and present-day Russia together in the same onslaught[6].

-   And finally, there is a sting in the tail: in the concluding lines, responsibility for Russia's threatening attitude is partly laid at the door of the United States since "to a certain extent, it draws inspiration from American diplomatic strategy, which proceeds through aggression to consolidate its sphere of influence".

Could this be the first step in a collaborative "American Threat Theory?"