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Chinese think-tanks and their status as privy councillors[+]

Extract and translated from the French E-bulletin China Analysis – Les Nouvelles de Chine n°16, Nov–Dec. 2007, pp.9-11

French Editor: M.Meidan/M.Duchâtel. Translation: Jonathan Hall

 

Critical summary by Michal Meidan of the following:

- Ma Changbo, "An enquiry into the official research centres in China", Nanfang Zhoumou, October 11th 2007.

 

This article was published in Nanfang Zhoumou on the eve of the 17th Chinese Communist Party Congress. Its aim is to throw light on the "well known and yet also obscure" world of official Chinese research centres and their influence on the nation's decision-making. In the overall context of the Chinese leadership's proclaimed intention to make their decisions more "scientific and democratic",[1] the enquiry by Nanfang Zhoumou gives a sharp insight into the relationship between the decision-makers and the world of research in China.


[1] See Michal Meidan, "The democratic reform according to the 17th Congress" in this issue.

He describes the best known of the Chinese think tanks and identifies their means of interacting with the decision-makers, as well as the different outlets through which their opinions are conveyed: conferences, discussion meetings, reports, articles, and specially arranged meetings with leaders. Through the picture presented by this writer, the reader grasps the nature of a relationship which is as much a function of the status of the research institute as of the personal affinities between a particular leader and an expert.

 

Ma distinguishes between two types of research centre. The first of these is a place for training cadres, of which the best known are the Party School and the School of Administrative Studies, which serve as a platform for organising meetings and exchanges between experts and leaders from the different provinces.

 

As the Party School clearly functions as guide, adviser, and trainer in the ideological field, it is not surprising to see journalists crowding around those who teach there to gather their views, particularly at the time of Party Congresses or before major political announcements. The continual to-and-fro between the Party cadres and the lecturers at the School means that the latter, who often take part in drawing up statements, turn out to be reliable sources for the detection of future trends. A good example is the way in which the official Xinhua press agency emphasised the importance of Hu Jintao's speech to the Party School on June 25th 2007, as an indicator of the political line to be adopted at the 17th Congress[1].

 

The School of Administrative Studies ( 国家行政学院, guojia xingzheng xueyuan) also participates in drawing up documents and conducting research in the important areas of political or economic reforms. For example, it has recently completed a study on the social security system which will be submitted to the State Council. On average, it produces two studies each year, which are the outcome of working group meetings involving ministers, vice-ministers, or local leaders concerned with the issue concerned. These working groups then send a report to the State Council, and this is followed by an informal discussion between State Council leaders and researchers to address the conclusions which they have reached. The State Council may then produce a statement on the question, and it is in light of the "spirit of this statement" and the conclusions of the working group that a ministerial group is formed in order to carry out improvements to the text of the statement. Finally, this text is submitted to the State Council for approval.

 

In 1998, the School of Administrative Studies completed some research projects on the reform and supervision of the banking system, and in 2000 their attention turned to the implementation of the policy of "developing the Big Western Region" (西部开发, xibu kaifa). This year the two meetings have been concerned with keeping social order and social security. The Party School is thought to be proceeding in the same general direction, but on different specific topics.

 

The research centres which are directly dependent upon the State Council, like the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CAS and CASS) or the powerful macroeconomic research centre of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), produce between 300 and 400 studies per year. They are also involved in the research and compilation of texts for the five-year plans and for administrative regulations. They deal more with economic issues, whereas the schools take part in writing Party Congress or plenary session speeches.

 

What are the channels of communication and influence?

 

The writer points to many kinds of communication between the institutions and the decision-makers, the first of which are studies "commissioned" by leaders, sometimes even on a paid basis. These reports may deal with cross-departmental subjects like macroeconomic controls or social management, or else more specific issues related to the field of the expert being consulted. The latter is sometimes brought into an enterprise to support the implementation of a policy initiative.

 

Most of these research projects are developed over a certain period of time, particularly those preparing for the five-year plans, which are undertaken by the NDRC. Others can be quite short-term or even urgent, as was the case at the time of the Asian economic crisis or the events of September 11th.

 

Another means of communication available to experts are "internal" publications. These reports are not necessarily commissioned by the authorities, but they are often read by leading politicians, and may have been undertaken as the outcome of a personal encounter with an expert. Similarly, this author reports that an official or his secretary sometimes takes a close interest in some researchers' work, and asks to receive an internal report as soon as it is published.

 

But the most direct channel of expert influence is still through personal encounters outside the main business of conferences and forums. These take the form of private conversations, or study sessions for politburo leaders during which experts are called to present their field of expertise.

 

The frequency of these exchanges, and the number of reports which the research centres are required to produce, have increased steadily since the beginning of the reforms and the opening up, but they have leaped ahead over the last decade as the questions demanding attention have become more complex and the leaders are becoming more willing to rationalise the decision-making procedures. There is a greater demand for experts and their advice gets more attention. Wen Jiabao himself has stated his view that no piece of expert advice could do him any harm.

 

It is worth noting, however, that no mention is made of the role and status of centres specialising in international affairs, or of university centres. And there is a noticeable paucity of details concerning the State Council's Centre for Research and Development, even though it is referred to in passing.

 

When expert influence is solicited, its status in the system remains ambiguous, and this writer reports a cautious tone in the way policy recommendations are formulated even when this is not explicitly called for ("given the close relations between researchers and decision-makers, it may happen that a researcher influences political decisions by alluding to a particular recommendation"). On the other hand, given the frequency of their interaction with the political leaders, experts who do not belong to official circles nonetheless tend to talk as though their views had official approval. For example, when China decided not to devalue the renmenbi in the face of the Asian crisis, one researcher was reported as recommending a degree of flexibility in the value of the national currency. The immediate result was a destabilisation of the Hong Kong markets. The situation was only rectified after the NDRC affirmed that there would be no change in the value of the currency.

 

There can be little doubt, however, that Chinese leaders are more inclined than they were to call upon experts over various questions, and that the latter, whether consciously or not, have a direct or indirect influence on the decisions made by the political leadership. Ma has the final word on this issue: "The beginning of the reforms was the hour of  the economists;  after the 15th Congress it was the legal experts who were in greatest demand. Now it is the turn of the sociologists."


[1] See Michal Meidan, "The democratic debate has not been stifled", China Analysis no. 14, July-August 2007.
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