Extract and translated from the French E-bulletin “Japan Analysis – La Lettre du Japon” n°11, March 2008, p. 7-8. adapted from Kōno Tarō[1], Mabuchi Sumio[2], Chūōkōron, March 2008, pp. 208-216 (interview).
French Editor: G. Delamotte. Translation: Jonathan Hall
Two of the seven contributors to the preceding article answer questions from a lecturer at Saitama University, Io Jun, and expand on their proposals.
S. Mabuchi: The "junior" elected members from the Democratic and Liberal Democrat parties set up a joint working group after last July's elections to the Upper House.
T. Kōno: I was elected for my first term in 1996. Since then, I have made only one intervention during a plenary session, shortly after my election, and in the following ten years I became extremely frustrated. Hashimoto was Prime Minister at the time, and a special committee had been set up to amend the law concerning Okinawa, which I had joined in the hope of playing an active part, but that did not happen: members of the Diet from the majority side had to remain silent and listen; only the final Friday vote mattered. Members sitting around me were all busy reading novels! When the majority in the Upper House changed, I thought that was all over at last! There could now be an exchange of views between members from the majority and the opposition, and the majority members could play an active role.
If the LDP and the Minshutō were to form a coalition, we would go back to the system where a bill decreed by a minister is passed without a comma being altered.
S. Mabuchi: When I return to my Nara constituency, people tell me that we ought to work together for the common good, "Minshutō or Jimintō, basically what's the difference?". But before thinking about a coalition, we must reform the Diet so that it functions as a place of real debate.
The lack of continuity between the debates in different sessions encourages the opposition parties, particularly the Minshutō, to denounce the flaws in government bills, to put an end to all debate, and to simply wait for the end of the session which will make all discussion superfluous. It is difficult to find a constructive approach with a view to improving a bill. The opposition members also have their own frustrations. Many foreign governments have opted for parliamentary sessions lasting throughout the year, which gives more time for discussion than our system of separate sessions [normally lasting 150 days].
T. Konō: It is the opposition's fault that the committee's agenda is only known one day in advance. The agenda is decided by a meeting of party secretaries [riji kondankai] on the basis of information provided by each secretary. The opposition provides this information at the last moment, most probably because they are used to slowing down a bill's progress and waiting for the session to end. If the government uses its majority to push its bills through, the opposition then denounces it as an abuse of power. This is an example of the type of sterile battles in the parliamentary calendar produced by the opposition.
S. Mabuchi: The blame also lies at the government's door, for trying to get its bills voted through without any alterations. There is no point in trying to show the flaws in any bill and making the civil servants go pale during the session; the government just moves to the vote.
T. Kōno: An extreme illustration of this was the law on IT data security put forward by the Economics Ministry.



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